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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1977, the United States Supreme Court handed down
the landmark decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.' Reaffirming
its decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,'
the Court held that in a treble damages action where defendants are
charged with price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,3
first purchasers, and not others down the distribution line ("indirect
purchasers"), are injured by the full amount of any overcharge; and
indirect purchasers are prohibited from offering proof that illegal over-
charges had been "passed on" to them by their sellers.4
The holding in Illinois Brick was narrow in scope, a pragmatic
resolution of the very complicated passing on5 issue. The principle
1. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
3. 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1980).
4. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977).
5. Passing on or pass on refers to the process by which a buyer shifts all
or part of an overcharge onto the party at the next link in the distribution line, e.g.,
an overcharged wholesaler would add to its selling price an amount reflecting increas-
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basis for the Court's ruling was its perception that enormous com-
plexities which would inevitably arise in tracing overcharges past first
purchasers in the distribution chain would unduly complicate treble
damages proceedings and thereby reduce their effectiveness.' Addition-
ally, the Court feared that sanctioning plaintiffs' use of "passing on"
would expose defendants to multiple liability and enhance the
likelihood of duplicative recoveries.7 While recognizing that its decis-
ion may in some cases permit antitrust violations to go unpunished
and close the door on certain meritorious treble damages claims by
indirect purchasers, the Court held that, on balance, the goals of the
antitrust laws are better served by holding direct purchasers to be
injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by
attempting to apportion the overcharge among all buyers down the
distribution line who may have absorbed a part of it.'
At the same time, the Court invited Congress to provide a
legislative solution to the practical problems inherent in large antitrust
litigation with plaintiffs at various levels in the chain of distribution.9
Although several bills had been introduced to overturn the decision
in Illinois Brick so as to permit indirect purchasers to recover damages
in price-fixing cases,'" Congress has declined to enact any measure
to modify or override the Illinois Brick holding, despite strong sup-
port for such legislation by the Department of Justice, States'
Attorneys General and the plaintiffs' bar in general."
Thus, Congress has left to the courts the task of harmonizing
ed acquisition costs and perhaps additional profit. See, Zinser v. Continental Grain,
Inc., 660 F.2d 754, 760 (10th Cir. 1981); cert. denied, sub. noma., Zinser v. Palmby,
U.S. __, 5 CCH Trade Cases, 60,021 (February 22, 1982); In re Beef Industry An-
titrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir. 1979); In re New Mexico Natural Gas
Antitrust Litigation, 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases, 64,685 (D.N.M. 1982).
6. Id. at 738-44.
7. Id. at 737.
8. Id. at 746-47.
9. Id. at 746.
10. E.g., S.2772, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982); S.300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 2060, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S.1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). S 3; H.R.
11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 5 2; H.R. 8359, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
11. See, e.g., Fair and Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, S. 1874: Hear-
ings Before the Sub-Committee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the
Judiciary. United States Senate, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. at 9-17, 101-04, 105-07, 107-28,
170 (Testimony of Messrs. Shenefield, Browning, Turner, Hill, Wilson, Speigel and Young
respectively); Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, Hearings Bejbre the Sub-
committee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. House
of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 8359 at 6-25; 23-71 (Testimony of Mr.
Shenefield and panel consisting of Messrs. Browning, Hill, Reed, Gorton and Marvin).
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the theoretical goals of antitrust enforcement and the practical limita-
tions on achieving these goals through the judicial process. Despite
the Supreme Court's unequivocal ruling elevating direct purchasers
to a preferred position as antitrust plaintiffs, the lower federal courts
have been somewhat reluctant to throw out indirect purchaser claims;
and in attempting to salvage such claims, have placed glosses on the
Illinois Brick holding, which have in turn generated a series of con-
fusing rulings on the intended scope of the direct purchaser rule and
the exceptions thereto. Since these issues will ultimately have to be
resolved by the Supreme Court, the need to revisit Illinois Brick at
this time is especially intense.
The purposes of this article are to: (1) provide a comprehensive
review of Illinois Brick and its progeny to clarify and, to the extent
possible, harmonize the bewildering result-oriented judicial precedents
on the offensive use of passing on which have emerged in the wake
of Illinois Brick, contrary to the express holding in that case; (2)
discuss the application of the Illinois Brick rationale to the related
area of standing in treble damages actions and particularly to the
umbrella theory of damages; and (3) reflect on whether the courts
by applying the Illinois Brick rule have demonstrated the capacity
to deal with the practical problems of complex litigation or whether
legislation will be necessary to solve such problems.
II. BACKGROUND TO Illinois Brick
A. Hanover Shoe
It is impossible to fully grasp the philosophical underpinnings
of the Illinois Brick decision without an in-depth understanding of
the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Hanover Shoe. Hanover Shoe
was a treble damages action for overcharges against defendant
manufacturer of shoe machinery brought by plaintiff shoe-manufacturer
which leased shoe machinery from defendant." Plaintiff alleged that
defendant's business practices, particularly its "lease only" policy with
respect to shoe machinery, which prohibited plaintiff from purchas-
ing such machinery, violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, 3 causing
plaintiff to pay far more in rental under the lease agreement than
it would have had to pay were it permitted to purchase the
12. The Hanover Shoe treble damages action arose out of a government injunc-
tive action entitled United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), al/yd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) which resulted in judgment for the govern-
ment. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 483 (1968).
13. 15 U.S.C. S 2.
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equipment.' The Court rejected defendant's contention that plaintiff
had suffered no legally congnizable damages because it has "passed
on" any overcharges by simply increasing the price of shoes sold to
its customers and held that except in very limited circumstances, a
direct purchaser is injured by the full amount of any overcharge paid.'"
The rationale underlying the rejection of the "passing on" defense
was the Court's perception of the pitfalls in analyzing business de-
cision in the "real economic world" rather than in an "economist's
hypothetical [econometric] model."'" The Court stated:
We are not impressed with the argument that sound laws
of economics require recognizing this [passing on] defense.
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing
policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the re-
levant conditions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed
a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one
fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general
economic conditions more buoyant, or the labor market
tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price.
Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world
rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what ef-
fect a change in a company's price will have on its total
sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total
sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that
the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount
of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total
sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the
nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the par-
ticular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices
absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had
the overcharge been discontinued. Since establishing the
applicability of the passing-on defense would require a con-
vincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable
figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable."
14. 392 U.S. at 483.
15. Id. at 487-88.
16. Id. at 492.
17. Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added). The Court thus identified several key fac-
tors which made measurement of "passed on" overcharges highly speculative, if not
impossible:
1. Bases for pricing decisions
In making pricing decisions, a businessman looks at many parameters in addition
to the cost of a single source of supply. Id. Hence, a shoe manufacturer would pro-
19831
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The "could not" or "would not" analysis is key to understanding
Hanover Shoe and its offspring, Illinois Brick. Of course, any number
of factors other than overcharges by the defendant could have occa-
sioned a price rise by the first purchaser. Moreover, the fact that
the first purchaser's price rise follows the imposition of illegal over-
charges, does not establish that the first purchaser was not damaged
thereby. 8 The timing of the defendant's price rise may have been for-
bably take into account a number of factors besides the rental cost of a shoe machine,
including cost of building rental, labor costs, materials acquisition costs, transporta-
tion costs, availability and cost of credit, prices charged by competitors for comparable
shoes, and expectations as to future demand, inflation and general employment levels.
A change in any of these factors is likely to have an impact on pricing decisions by
the shoe manufacturer (and in these inflationary times would no doubt result in an
increase in the price of shoes). Thus, the notion inherent in the pass on defense that
any overcharge incurred by a customer can readily be traced and isolated in the price
that such a customer charges his customers is fallacious.
2. Impact of price increases
In the real world, it is difficult to measure with any accuracy the effect on total
sales of any price increase imposed by the overcharged purchaser to his buyers. Id.
Economists measure a buyer's sensitivity to price changes by elasticity analysis. If
a buyer is sensitive to price changes in a product, i.e. will reduce his volume of pur-
chases when prices increase, his demand is said to be relatively elastic. Sophisticated
econometric models can be devised to measure a buyer's demand elasticity and pro-
vide an estimate of how much of an increment an overcharged purchaser can pass
on to his buyer without affecting sales volume. Such a model could also theoretically
measure the decline in sales the overcharged purchaser could expect to suffer were
he to pass on 100% of any overcharge.
Such econometric models, however, are expensive to devise, difficult to fully com-
prehend and at best only "guesstimators." Introduction of such econometric analysis
into evidence would surely complicate and possibly unduly obfuscate antitrust pro-
ceedings. Moreover, such devices may be totally irrelevant in measuring change in
sales volume. A buyer may choose to reduce volume of purchases from the overcharg-
ed purchaser for reasons that have nothing to do with increases in acquisition costs.
For example, the buyer may have or perceive a change in taste; the buyer may be
retrenching its sale efforts because of recession-induced economic conditions. There
are any number of possible reasons for a decline in sales volume, none of which is
easy to pinpoint.
3. Ascertaining "but for" conduct
Were the alleged conspirator able to show that the first purchaser passed on
100% of any overcharge to its customers and such customers suffered no loss in total
sales or profit margin (a showing, which, as demonstrated above, is at the very least
unlikely), the defendant would find it nearly impossible to prove that but for the over-
charge the first purchaser "could not" or "would not" have raised its prices or main-
tained supracompetitive prices had the alleged overcharges ceased. Id.
18. As the Court in Hanover Shoe further noted:
The mere fact that a price rise followed an unlawful cost increase
does not show that the sufferer of the cost increase was undamaged. His
customers may have been ripe for his price rise earlier; if a cost rise
is merely the occasion for a price increase a businessman could have impos-
ed absent the rise in his costs, the fact that .he was earlier not enjoying
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
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tuitous. It is quite possible that the higher price to the ultimate pur-
chaser could have been charged long before its actual imposition.
Hence, a mere showing that the first purchaser's price increase follows
defendant's overcharge is not enough. Defendant must prove that the
first purchaser "could not" or "would not" maintain a given price ab-
sent any overcharge; such a burden cannot be sustained in the "real
economic world."' 9
B. Post-Hanover Shoe, Pre-Illinois Brick Decisions Regarding
Passing On
Hanover Shoe held that a party may not defend a price-fixing
charge by claiming that the plaintiff passed on any overcharges to
its customers, i.e. passing on may not be be used defensively.' Hanover
Shoe, however, did not address the question of whether a plaintiff
down the distribution line could prove that overcharges had been pass-
ed on to it; i.e. whether passing on could be used offensively.2 The
majority of lower courts upheld the offensive use of passing on,2
although a few held, as the Supreme Court would eventually rule in
Illinois Brick, that the logic of Hanover Shoe prohibited the offensive
as well as defensive use of passing on.23 However, a great deal of
the benefits of the higher price should not permit the supplier who charges
an unlawful price to take those benefits from him without being liable
for damages. This statement merely recognizes the usual principle that
the possessor of a right can recover for its unlawful deprivation whether
or not he was previously exercising it.
Id. at 493, n.9.
19. Id. at 493.
20. 392 U.S. at 491-92. This ruling is in line with prior Supreme Court holdings
wherein plaintiffs had indirect claims. E.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer
Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533 (1918) ("The general tendency of the law, in regard
to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step").
21. There are several obvious distinctions between the Hanover Shoe doctrine
and the offensive use of passing on. Hanover Shoe was a pro-plaintiff decision; to per-
mit the defensive use of passing on would serve to frustrate antitrust enforcement.
Allowing the offensive use of passing on would arguably promote antitrust enforce-
ment. Secondly, the result in Hanover Shoe was designed to prevent antitrust defen-
dants from gaining a windfall. Permitting the offensive use of passing on would arguably
prevent first purchasers who passed on overcharges from gaining a similar windfall.
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
22. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, cert. denied,
sub. nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971); In re Master
Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973 CCH Trade Cases 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v.
General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
23. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
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confusion existed as to the legal basis for granting or denying offen-
sive use of the passing on doctrine. Courts and commentators' discuss-
ed the issue in terms of "standing," 5 "remoteness"' and "passing on."'
It was thus left to the Supreme Court to clear the air.
III. Illinois Brick
A. The Illinois Brick Rule
The issue in Illinois Brick was, as between two types of pur-
chasers at different levels in the same vertical chain of distribution-
those purchasing directly from defendants and the customers of such
purchasers -which group had a claim for overcharges in a treble
damages action, arising out of an alleged price-fixing conspiracy by
manufacturers of concrete blocks in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 8 Plaintiffs, various state and local government entities,
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aJ)fd per curiam ub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); City and County of Denver
v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
24. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Anti-
biotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck
Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970); see, Berger and Bernstein, An Analytical
Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977); Handler & Blechman, Anti-
trust and Consumer Interest, The Fallacy of the Parens Patriae Approach, 85 YALE L.
J. 626, 638-48 (1976); Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use
of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 976, 977-79 (1975); Comment, Mangano and Ultimate
Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 394 (1972).
25. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 467-68, (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd,
536 F.2d 1163, 1164-67 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d
191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 1973 CCH Trade Cases 1 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
26. See, In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(purchasers of animal feed into which alleged priced fixed antibiotics had been incorporat-
ed too remote to sue manufacturers of such antibiotics); Boshes v. General Motors
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
27. See supra n. 22.
28. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977). The rule of Illinois
Brick applies only in treble damages actions and does not apply to actions for injunct-
ions pursuant to S 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 26, In re Chicken Antitrust
Litigation American Poultry, 669 F.2d 228, 238 (5th Cir. 1982); Mid-West Paper Products
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 589-94 (3d Cir. 1979). Nor does the Illinois
Brick decision bar plaintiffs from pursuing state law remedies. Compare Alton Box
Board Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases 1 64,711 (9th Cir. 1982) (action
by indirect purchasers for damages under California's Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code S 16720, 16750) with Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 1982-1 CCH Trade
Cases 1 64,886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (state court antitrust action under California's Cart-
wright Act barred under the doctrine of res judicata by dismissal of prior federal
antitrust claims on Illinois Brick grounds). See, In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
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admittedly did not deal directly with the defendants but rather pur-
chased buildings into which the price-fixed concrete blocks had been
incorporated." Plaintiffs claimed that the overcharges imposed by the
concrete block manufacturers had been passed on to them by interven-
ing parties in the chain of distribution and that they had therefore
suffered "injury" under section 4 of the Clayton Act2 Defendants mov-
ed for summary judgment on the authority of Hanover Shoe.
The Court was thus confronted with the question of whether to
reaffirm the principles of Hanover Shoe and hold that only the over-
charged direct purchaser-as opposed to the indirect purchasers down
the distribution line-should be deemed to have suffered the full in-
jury from the alleged overcharge, or to modify Hanover Shoe and per-
mit multiple claims to the same overcharge by plaintiffs at different
points in the chain of distribution who can show passing on.31 The
Court again chose to concentrate the full amount of any overcharge
in the hands of the first purchaser, stating "that the overcharged
direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture and
distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or property' within
the meaning of [section 4 of the Clayton Act]."'32 The majority thus
adopted a rule of symmetry regarding the offensive use of passing
on, thereby barring indirect purchasers from maintaining treble
damages actions whenever the antitrust defendant would be preclud-
ed from asserting the passing on defense against a direct purchaser.3
The Court discussed at length the policy reasons underlying the
rule of symmetry in Illinois Brick.'
American Poultry, 669 F.2d 228, 238 (5th Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Ala. Code S 6-5-60 (1975)
(indirect purchasers have right of damages actions against violators of state antitrust
laws); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 16750(a) (1981) (individual may sue for indirect injury
to business from antitrust violation). Cf. Fla. Stat. SS 542.18-542.23 (1980) (state may
sue parens patriae for violations of state antitrust laws).
29. Blocks were purchased from defendants by masonry contractors and used
to build masonry structures; those structures were incorporated into entire buildings
by general contractors and then sold to, among others, governmental entities. Id. at 726.
30. 15 U.S.C. S 15.
31. 431 U.S. at 728-29.
32. Id. at 729.
33. Id.
34. The pros and cons of the Illinois Brick ruling barring plaintiffs' use of the
passing on theory have been debated at length in the literature; e.g., W. Landes &
R. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws?
An Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979) (generally support-
ing the Illinois Brick holding); cf. R. Harris & L. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly
Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979) (criticizing
the rule of Illinois Brick). See, W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economics of Passing On,
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1. Tracing Problems
The Court found that any attempt to trace complex economic
adjustments to a change in the cost of a particular factor of production
would greatly complicate already complex antitrust proceedings and
bog the Court down in numerous side issues which did not go to the
heart of the alleged misconduct." The Court further reasoned eviden-
tiary complexities which were identified in Hanover Shoe (where pass-
ing on was used as a defense) would be present in spades where a
plaintiff, several steps removed from the defendant-price-fixer in the
chain of distribution, sought to use passing on offensively."
2. Impairment of the Treble Damages Remedy
The introduction of complex tracing problems into antitrust lit-
igation would, the Court feared, reduce the effectiveness of treble
damages actions as a tool for enforcing the antitrust laws. 7 Indirect
purchasers, with a comparatively small monetary interest in the lit-
igation, have far less incentive to sue than the direct purchasers who
are not only spared the burden of tracing overcharges but also permit-
ted to recover the full amount of any overcharge under Hanover Shoe.'
3. Risks of Multiple Liability and Inconsistent Judgments
The court further noted that any departure from Hanover Shoe
to permit the offensive use of passing on would create an "unaccept-
A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274 (1980); R. Harris & L. Sullivan,
Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Response to Landes and Posner, 128 U. PA.
L. REV. 1280 (1980). That debate will not be rekindled here, except to note that even the
most forceful opponents of the Illinois Brick holding fail to come to grips with a basic
tenet of that ruling: proof of passing on requires a number of assumptions which can-
not be easily or accurately translated from the economist's hypothetical model to the
real economic world. See, e.g., R. Harris & L. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Over-
charge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269, 277-79 (1979).
35. 431 U.S. at 725, 736.
36. Id. at 740, n.3.
37. Id. at 731, n.12. Justice White wrote for the majority:
The concern in Hanover Shoe for the complexity that would be
introduced into treble-damage suits if pass-on theories were permitted
was closely related to the Court's concern for the reduction in the effec-
tiveness of those suits if brought by indirect purchasers with a smaller
stake in the outcome than that of direct purchasers suing for the full
amount of the overcharge. . . .The combination of increasing the costs
and diffusing the benefits of bringing a treble-damage action could seriously
impair this important weapon of antitrust enforcement.
Id. at 745.
38. Id. at 746.
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able risk of multiple liability" and "open the door to duplicative
recoveries."3 9 Under Hanover Shoe, the direct purchaser would
automatically recover the full amount of any overcharge it had pass-
ed on; allowing offensive use of passing on would enable indirect
purchasers to sue for recovery of all or part of the same amount and
thereby expose defendants to liability in an amount far in excess of
any ill-gotten gains obtained through price-fixing.4" Moreover, permit-
ting offensive but not defensive use of passing on would inevitably
give rise to inconsistent judgments.41 Thus, one court might find in
a direct purchaser suit that the defendants committed no illegal acts,
while another court in a subsequent suit against the same defendants
on the very same facts by indirect purchasers-not parties to the
direct purchaser suit-might find for the plaintiffs.42
B. Exceptions to the Illinois Brick Rule Barring Indirect Purchasers
from Maintaining Treble Damages Claims
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick recognized that complex trac-
ing problems and the possibility of duplicative recoveries did not
always present insurmountable obstacles to recovery. In two very
narrowly defined circumstances, the Court found that a plaintiff who
did not purchase directly from the alleged antitrust violator might
be able to prove that overcharges were passed on to it without the
necessity of analyzing complex price-output decisions and relative
elasticities: (1) a situation where there is a pre-existing cost-plus con-
tract between the first purchaser and its customer;43 and (2) where
the first-purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer."
39. Id. at 730.
40. Id. at 730-31.
41. Id. at 737-39.
42. The injustice of inconsistent verdicts would be further compounded by the
fact that other indirect purchasers, not parties to either suit against the defendants
may then under the doctrine of collateral estoppel be able to avail themselves of
favorable factual findings in the prior proceeding, effectively estopping defendants from
relitigating liability. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
43. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977). The same exception
was recognized by the Court in Hanover Shoe in the context of the defensive use of
passing on. 392 U.S. at 494.
44. 431 U.S. at 736, n.16. While Hanover Shoe was silent on the application
of this exception, it is clear that it pertains equally to defensive and offensive passing
on situations. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980);
In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.2d 13, 19 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Coordinat-
ed Proceedings In Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 497 F. Supp. 218, 226 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); see, Dart Drug Corp. v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1979).
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1. The "Pre-Existing Cost-Plus Contract" Exception
The problem of tracing does not arise in the situation where a
pre-existing cost-plus contract, 5 fixing in advance the quantities to
be purchased, exists between the first purchaser and his customer,
(the "indirect purchaser"). As the Court pointed out:
In such a situation, the [first] purchaser is insulated from
any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to pass-
on the overcharge, because its customer [the indirect
purchaser] is committed to buying a fixed quanity regardless
of price. The effect of the overcharge is essentially deter-
mined in advance, without reference to the interaction of
supply and demand that complicates the determination [of
the amount of the overcharge] in the general case. 6
Thus, the pre-existing cost-plus exception has three elements:
a. a provision providing for automatic passing on to the full ex-
tent of the overcharge to indirect purchasers;
b. the direct purchaser is insulated from any decrease in sales
or profit; and
c. a contract exists which commits the indirect purchaser to
buying a fixed quantity regardless of price."
45. The Court did not define precisely what was meant by cost-plus contract.
There are essentially two basic methods used in cost-based pricing: mark-up pricing
and cost-plus pricing. R. Harris & L. Sullivan; Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge:
A Cornprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 303-04 (1979). Under mark-up
pricing, widely practiced by wholesalers, the direct cost of a product is its invoice
cost. Id. at 304. The resale price is determined by adding to the invoice cost a more
or less fixed percentage mark-up over the invoice cost, designed to cover indirect costs
and provide a profit. Id. A second type of mark-up pricing, frequently employed by
retailers involves "manufacturer's suggested retail price." Id. at 305. The seller charges
the manufacturer's suggested retail price and the mark-up is the difference between
the suggested resale price and the acquisition cost. Id.
The cost-plus pricing system is most frequently used by manufacturers and con-
tractors. Id. Unlike mark-up pricing, cost-plus pricing entails a deliberate cost-allocation
process by which the manufacturers determine for each product the costs associated
with the production of one unit of that product. Id. These are denominated direct
costs. Id. Indirect costs are then determined by equal apportionment among all pro-
duct lines or in the same ratio as direct costs occur. Id. The indirect costs may be
set in dollar terms or in terms of a percentage of fixed costs. Id. at 306. In contrast,
under a mark-up system, there is no effort to allocate fixed costs to each product
line. Id. at 305.
46. 431 U.S. at 736 (emphasis supplied).
47. Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
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The key element here is the pre-existing, fixed quantity nature
of the contract." In such a situation, the indirect purchaser is locked-
in to buying a set amount; and the first purchaser suffers no injury
from any overcharge because he has no loss of sales volume. 9 As
discussed more fully below, many courts talk loosely in terms of the
"cost-plus" exception,' but it is not enough under Illinois Brick to
cf: In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 64,815 (N.D.
Tex. 1982).
48. A simple hypothetical will illustrate the operation of a fixed quantity, pre-
existing cost-plus contract. Assume that the first purchaser (FP) and his customer,
the indirect purchaser (IP), have entered into a pre-existing cost-plus contract which
obligates IP to purchase specified quantities from FP. FP's source of supply, M, is
engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy and pursuant thereto overcharges FP. The con-
spiratorial charge to FP by M (FP's acquisition cost) is $12 per unit, while the price
that would have prevailed absent a conspiracy was $10 per unit. Under the FP-IP
contract, IP must purchase 1 million units per year from FP at FP's acquisition cost
plus 10%. The total cost paid by IP during the conspiracy is $13.2 million; but for
the conspiracy IP would have paid $11 million. In other words, IP pays $2.2 million
more than he would have paid but for the conspiracy. FP on the other hand, is not
out of pocket one penny, since 100% of the overcharge is passed on. FP not only
suffers no volume loss but retains his 10% profit-margin over costs.
49. This situation is equivalent to perfect inelasticity of demand; the same
amount will be demanded, irrespective of price. Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
487 F. Supp. 808, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). As the Court in Lefrak demonstrated, the
fixed-quantity, pre-existing cost-plus contract would look as follows on a graph. Id.
at 819, n.19.
D
S,
Price
P1
PO
Q0 Quantity
50. E.g., In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, sub. nom. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Assn.,
449 U.S. 905 (1980); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 516 F. Supp. 1287,
1292 (D. Md. 1981).
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have a cost-plus contract without having provisions for fixed
quantities."
2. The Ownership or Control Exception
In addition to the pre-existing "cost-plus" contract situation, the
Court in Illinois Brick suggested in footnote sixteen in its opinion
a second possible exception to its general holding barring proof of
passing on, the "ownership or control" exception.' The rationale
underlying this exception is similar to the rationale for the "pre-
existing cost-plus contract" exception: where there is ownership of
the first purchaser, whether by the alleged price fixer or by the in-
direct purchaser, the market forces are superseded and complex prob-
lems of tracing and price-output adjustments do not arise.' Further-
more, the exception is rooted in common sense, for were it not
recognized, the "direct purchaser" rule of Illinois Brick could be easily
evaded by creating dummy entities as intermediate purchasers."
In creating the "ownership or control" exception, to the general
51. Where quantities are not contractually fixed in advance, IP may decide
to decrease his volume of purchases in view of FP's price increase. Should IP reduce
his volume, FP may claim injury based on lost sales. In such a situation, IP cannot
claim to have suffered the full brunt of the overcharge and a detailed assessment
of price/output functions would still be necessary. This, of course, would present precise-
ly the situation which the Court in Illinois Brick sought to avoid. Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
52. The Court noted:
Another situation in which market forces have been superseded and
the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct-purchaser is
owned or controlled by its customer, cf. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395
U.S. 642, 648, 89 S.Ct. 1871, 1874, 23 L.Ed.2d 559 (1969); In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197, 199 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
919, 94 S.Ct. 1419, 39 L.Ed.2d 474 (1974).
Id. at 736, n.16.
53. Id. Subsequent lower court decisions have held that the "control" exception
applies not only where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer
but also where it is owned or controlled by its supplier. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota
Antitrust Litigation, 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981); see, In re Beef Industry
Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1979); Jewish Hospital Ass'n.,
v. Stewart Mechanical Enterprises, Inc. 628 F.2d 971, 974-75 (6th Cir. 1980) cert. denied,
450 U.S. 966 (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 121, n.6 (D. Minn.
1980); Dart Drug Corp. v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (D. Md. 1979);
see also, Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in
Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 327 (1978).
54. See, Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573,
589 (3d Cir. 1979) ("... to bar the purchaser from the subsidiary [of a price-fixer]
from suing on the authority of Illinois Brick would invite evasion [of the antitrust
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rule of Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court did not elaborate on precisely
what was meant by "ownership or control."55 Nor have the lower
courts, as more fully discussed below, developed a definitive test to
determine "ownership or control" in the few cases which have arisen
on this issue.,
IV. POST-Illinois Brick JURISPRUDENCE
In the absence of legislation, the task of delineating the
parameters of Illinois Brick has fallen on the courts. The decision
in Illinois Brick has undeniable potential to create harsh results in
certain individual cases, 7 particularly where it is clear that a plaintiff-
indirect purchaser has been overcharged because of an illegal con-
spiracy and that plaintiff-indirect purchaser is barred from recovery
largely because of perceived problems in proving damages." Not sur-
prisingly, Illinois Brick has not been especially popular with the lower
laws] by the simple expedient of inserting a subsidiary between the violator and the
first non-controlled purchaser.").
55. Dart Drug Corp. v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1103 (D. Md.
1979).
56. Some clues as to exactly what the Supreme Court had in mind may be
gleaned from the two cases cited in footnote 16. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S.
642, 647-48 (1969), involved an action under S 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13(a), in which the defendant-supplier allegedly
channeled illegal discounts to competitors of plaintiff through its 60% owned subsidiary.
The Court held that plaintiff's right to recover was not impeded by the additional
formal transactions which occurred prior to reaching the level of its competitor. The
Ninth Circuit in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198-99 (9th Cir.
1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974) held that suppliers' sales of price-fixed asphalt
to indirect purchasers through contractors whom the asphalt suppliers controlled either
by acquisition of stock, or indirectly through various financial arrangements, including
credit, were not insulated from liability by the holding in Hanover Shoe.
Thus, the Supreme Court contemplated that the "ownership or control" excep-
tion apply where (1) the parent-subsidiary relationship exists between the seller and
direct purchaser and (2) where the seller is able to exercise de facto dominion over
the direct purchaser, absent ownership of a majority of stock in the direct purchaser.
See, Note, Scaling The Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers In An-
titrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 327 (1977).
57. The Supreme Court so conceded: "It is true that, in elevating direct purchas-
ers to a preferred position as private attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe rule denies
recovery to those indirect purchasers who may have been actually injured by antitrust
violations." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
58. In this respect, the rule of Illinois Brick is closely akin to the per se doc-
trine governing certain S 1 Sherman Act violations "which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without any elaborate inquiry as to the precise
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courts, which have been torn between the mechanical, per se approach
of Illinois Brick9 and a more expansive approach giving the indirect
purchaser-plaintiff every opportunity to fit itself within the recognized
exceptions to the direct purchaser rule enunciated in Illinois Brick."
Most litigation has focused on the applications of the "pre-existing
cost-plus" and "ownership or control" exceptions. Several courts have
broadened the "pre-existing cost-plus"'" and "ownership or control"6
exceptions beyond the narrowly defined limits staked out by Illinois
Brick and in so doing, threaten to re-introduce the very same com-
plicated issues which the Illinois Brick holding had supposedly
harm they caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Justice Marshall's comments on the per se approach in his dissenting opinion
in United States v. Container Corporation, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969), are equally apt
in describing the rule of Illinois Brick:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are
justified on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule
will far outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages
will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus the ad-
ministrative costs of determining in what particular situations the practice
may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If the
potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then
they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.
59. E.g., Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573
(3d Cir. 1979).
60. E.g., In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 523 F. Supp 1116, 1119
(C.D. Cal. 1981) (Plaintiffs who admittedly could not show that they were owned or
controlled by alleged conspirators were permitted to attempt to show that defendants
control over them was so pervasive that they could fix the retail prices of gasoline
without any uncontrolled discretion being exercised by the gasoline station operators
that made the sale. Held: Plaintiffs had failed to establish such control). The court
further stated:
I have had considerable sympathy for the plaintiffs as they faced
the problem of Illinois Brick, and have given them somewhat extended
opportunity to develop and assert just how they propose to surmount
it. After several valiant written and oral attempts, the answer is clear,
they simply cannot do it; Illinois Brick makes it impossible to proceed
in these cases with the type of class that is here proposed.
Id. at 1119.
See also, In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978)
(plaintiff who purchased product into which price-fixed component had been incorporated
by subsidiary of alleged price fixer not barred by Illinois Brick).
61. E.g., In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979);
In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases, 64,685
(D.N.M. 1982).
62. E.g., Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/1
ILLINOIS BRICK
eliminated from multi-party antitrust litigation. Other courts have
fashioned implied exceptions to the direct purchaser rule" or at least
suggested that the exceptions spelled out in Illinois Brick are not
exclusive."
A. Pre-existing Cost-Plus Contract Exception Post-Illinois Brick
The contrasting judicial attitudes on the reach of the pre-existing
cost-plus exception are best illustrated in the differing results reached
by the Third and Fourth Circuits on that issue. The threshold issue
dividing the two circuits is whether under Illinois Brick an indirect
purchaser-plaintiff must establish an actual pre-existing, fixed quantity
cost-plus contract or whether the plaintiff need only establish the func-
tional equivalent of such an arrangement." In Mid-West Paper Pro-
ducts Co. v. Continental Group., Inc.," the Third Circuit limited the
use of the exception to situations where the plaintiff is a party to
a fixed-quantity cost-plus contract. On the other hand, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,7 ruled that a plaintiff
may meet the exception by proving a pricing mechanism that operates
in a manner functionally equivalent to a cost-plus contract." While
the Third Circuit test is concrete, straightforward and predictable,
the Fifth Circuit formulation is abstract, vague and open-ended, and
requires a court to "set sail on a sea of doubt" 9 whenever resolving
a passing on issue. The Third Circuit formulation better reflects the
narrow scope which the Supreme Court intended for any exception
to the rule of Illinois Brick. However, upon analysis the gap between
63. The so-called unnamed co-conspirator exception. See Fontana Aviation, Inc.
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980); Vermont v. Densmore Brick Co.,
1980-2 CCH Trade Cases 63,347 (D. Vt. 1980); Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 1980-2 CCH
Trade Cases 1 63,292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115 (D.
Minn. 1890).
64. In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases
64,685 (D.N.M. 1982); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 516 F. Supp.
1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981) ("Analysis of the policy consideration underlying Illinois Brick,
reveals quite clearly that the exceptions therein announced were not meant to be
necessarily exclusive.").
65. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases 1 64,815
(N.D. Tex. 1982).
66. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
67. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, sub nom. Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Meat Price Investigators Ass'n., 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
68. Id. at 1163.
69. See, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified and affd., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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the two circuits on the pre-existing cost-plus exception issue may not
be as wide as it might appear at first blush.70
1. Mid-West Paper and Beef Industry Compared
In Mid-West Paper, defendant manufacturer of paper bags moved
for summary judgment on the authority of Illinois Brick against the
indirect purchaser class of plaintiffs.7 1 The indirect purchaser-plaintiffs
argued that the informal oral arrangements through which they pur-
chased paper bags from middlemen who had purchased from defen-
dants brought them within the pre-existing cost-plus exception.72 The
court of appeals rejected this argument on two grounds: (1) to satisfy
the pre-exisiting cost-plus exception, plaintiff must prove the existence
of formal, fixed-quantity cost-plus contracts between themselves and
their middlemen suppliers; and (2) the informal oral arrangements
through which plaintiffs bought bags from middlemen were made pur-
suant to precisely the type of "cost-based rules of thumb" which the
Supreme Court specifically held were outside the pre-existing cost-
plus exception. 73 The court also reiterated the Illinois Brick ruling
that to fall within the exception, cost-plus contracts must fix in ad-
vance the quantity to be purchased in order to insulate the middlemen
from any loss of volume after passing along defendants' illegal
overcharges.
7
Beef Industry presented a mirror image of Mid-West Paper in
that plaintiffs, cattle ranchers and feeders, were sellers rather than
buyers, who alleged that defendants75 combined to fix prices at which
they purchased meat from slaughterhouses and meat packers, which,
in turn, caused the plaintiffs to receive less money for cattle sold to
70. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases 1 64,815
(N.D. Tex. 1982).
71. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 575
(3d Cir. 1979). Plaintiffs fell into three categories: (1) supermarkets and retailers which
had through middlemen purchased bags manufactured by the defendants but hadnot
purchased bags directly from the defendants; (2) a company which had purchased bags
from defendants' alleged co-conspirators but not from defendants; and (3) those who
had purchased bags directly from the defendants. Plaintiffs in the first group sought
to avoid defendants' summary judgment motion on the grounds that they fell within
the pre-existing cost-plus exception established in Illinois Brick.
72. Id. at 575-76.
73. Id. at 578-80.
74. Id. at 577 n.9.
75. Defendants were seventy-five retail food chains, a wholesale grocer, the
retail chain's national trade association and an industry national reporting service.
In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1979).
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meat packers.78 The chain of distribution was rather complicated;77
plaintiffs did not deal directly with the defendants but claimed that
defendants' collusive buying activities caused them to receive far less
for their cattle than they would have otherwise received."8
In response to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings 7
based on Illinois Brick, plaintiffs invoked the pre-existing cost-plus
exception. Plaintiffs were admittedly not parties to pre-existing, fixed-
76. Id.
77. The chart below was ultilized by the district court on remand to describe
the complex chain of distribution in the beef industry. In re Beef Industry Antitrust
Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 64,815 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
Ranchers
(Feeder Cattle)
4,
Cattle Feeders
(Fat Cattle)
(Fat Cattle) F Terminals, Auctions, etc.
(Fat Cattle)
I ,Packers/ I\
(Beef) (Beef) (By-Products)
Jobbers, Fabricators, Packers, etc./
(Beef)
refTanners etc.
Retail Grocery Chains
Hotels Fast Food Outlets ]
Restaurants 1 Government
78. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1979).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
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quantity cost-plus contracts with middlemen, but argued that since
they sold to middlemen at prices determined by strict and unvarying
application' of a formula to the defendants' published conspiratorial
"Yellow Sheet" prices, they had established the "functional equivalent"
of a cost-plus contract and hence were protected under Illinois Brick.81
The court endorsed the functional equivalent argument and upheld
the complaint against the motion for judgment on the pleadings.2
At the same time, the court emphasized that it was making only
a threshold determination that the allegations in plaintiffs' complaints
stated a claim within the "cost-plus" exception.' Plaintiffs would still
80. Plaintiffs argued that there was no reason to vary the pricing formula in
the short-run. Supply was inelastic. Plaintiffs lacked storage facilities and could not
withhold supply as a lever to increase prices. The retailers on the other hand, were
well-equipped with freezers and could adjust their buying practices accordingly. In
re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1165 (5th Cir. 1979).
81. Id.
82. The Fifth Circuit held:
The complaints sufficiently allege that the impact of the retail chains'
price changes upon the pricing decisions of the packers is determined in
advance without regard to the interactions of supply and demand. The
plaintiffs allege that the packers set the price of live cattle by strictly
applying certain formulae to the Yellow Sheet or Safeway wholesale beef
price. Under these allegations a plaintiff would be entitled, once he proved
what the competitive wholesale price would have been for a given grade
of beef in a given region at a given time, and once he established that
the packer to whom he sold strictly applied a formula to the Yellow Sheet
price for the particular sale, to damages in the amount of the difference
between the price he actually received on that sale of fat cattle and the
price he would have received absent price-fixing (computed by applying
the packer's formula to the constructed competitive wholesale price.) The
packer's habitual use of pre-determined formulae would enable measure-
ment of the effect on prices for fat cattle of changes in wholesale prices.
The plaintiffs have alleged the functional equivalent of cost-plus contracts.
Id.
83. The Fifth Circuit expressed the following caveat regarding the very broad
functional equivalent standard:
We emphasize that we are not ruling that these plaintiffs are entitl-
ed to go to trial. The Supreme Court intended that it be determined early
in the litigation whether (or to what extent) a party should be entitled
to present a pass-on theory at trial. The defendants will have the opportuni-
ty to raise that issue again by summary judgment motion. Given the stric-
tures of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the district court may and should
demand from the plaintiffs in each case a pretrial demonstration that they
have definite and particularized proof that they will need to establish
damages.
Id. at 1166-67.
This caveat was reiterated by the Fifth Circuit in In re Plywood Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 655 F.2d 627, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1981).
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have the enormous burden of adducing "definite and particularized
proof' as to individual transactions that middlemen purchased pur-
suant to pre-determined formulae." Ultimately, this burden proved
to be too much for the plaintiffs to sustain; as noted by the district
court on remand, granting defendants' subsequent summary judgment
motion:
True the fifth circuit was willing to allow [functional]
equivalency, but its language was skeptical and the condi-
tions for its demonstration are exacting. Moreover, its
tolerance of the effort was born in a procedural context in
which it had to indulge the proferred fantasy of the
feeders."
The Fifth Circuit thus sent out conflicting signals in establishing
the functional equivalent rule. On the one hand, it discouraged trial
courts from dismissing indirect purchaser claims on the pleadings, pro-
vided functional equivalence had been alleged. On the other hand, the
court of appeals established a level of proof so exacting as to preclude
the successful use of the cost-plus exception in virtually every situa-
tion except when the indirect purchaser is party to a pre-existing fixed-
quantity, cost-plus contract. Thus, the wisdom and utility of the func-
tional equivalent rule are at best dubious. Indeed, on remand in Beef
Industry, the enormous complexity and utter impossibility of proving
passing on even under the lenient functional equivalent standard were
amply demonstrated, and the district court entered summary judg-
ment for defendants."
84. Id. at 1166-67. Conceding that the "proposed proof is far from simple," the
court characterized the problem as "a complexity born of quantity" rather than quali-
ty, and noted that the "kinds of proof that will be involved, however, are not new
to the courts, and certainly not to antitrust courts." Id. at 1166.
85. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 1 64,815
(N.D. Tex. 1982),
86. The district court upon review of the fully developed record on the pass-
ing on issue concluded that the complexity of plaintiff's proof was not merely a quan-
titative problem but also a complexity born of quality. Id. Contrary to plaintiffs' con-
tentions that middlemen inevitably applied a rigid pricing formula, the district court
found that a variety of factors influenced packers' pricing decisions, including: (1) packers'
individual needs; (2) competition and negotiation for cattle; (3) estimating cattle
characteristics; (4) conditions in the cattle market; (5) the by-product market; (6) published
price lists; and (7) absorption of price depressions. Id.; see supra note 77. Thus it could
not be said that pricing decisions were "determined in advance without regard to the
interactions of supply and demand." Id. Moreover, defendants adduced empirical studies
which demonstrated that the "Yellow Sheet" did not serve as a precise pricing for-
mula and thus precluded credible proof of an ". . . habitual use of predetermined for-
mula [which] would enable measurement of the effect on prices for fat cattle or changes
1983]
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2. Functional Equivalence and Illinois Brick
The Fifth Circuit decision in Beef Industry misconceived the
thrust of Illinois Brick and is erroneous in that: (a) the "functional
equivalent" standard is contrary to both the express language and
the ratio decidendi of Illinois Brick; (b) the "functional equivalent"
analysis forces the courts to grapple with complicated, if not insolu-
ble, problems of tracing overcharges and apportioning damages be-
tween direct and indirect purchasers-the very types of problems that
the Illinois Brick holding sought to obviate; (c) such standard raises
the spectres of multiple liability, duplicative recoveries and inconsis-
tent judgments in treble damages actions; and (d) unfairly requires
the parties to spend large sums of money and manpower to prosecute
and to defend claims which are at best marginal.
a. Intended Narrow Scope of Any Exception to the Rule
Barring Proof of Passing On
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court intended that any exception
to the Illinois Brick holding be very circumscribed.87 This intent is
evidenced by the fact that (1) the Court identified only two specific
situations where market forces would be superseded and complex trac-
ing and apportionment problems would not arise;88 and (2) the Court
categorically rejected efforts to create exceptions for particular types
of markets." Specifically, the majority rejected arguments that "cost-
based rules of thumb" -strikingly similar to those used by middlemen
in Beef Industry - effectively supersede market forces and eliminate
in wholesale prices." Id. Finally, it was impossible for plaintiffs to prove that middle-
men did not absorb any of the alleged price depressions caused by defendants. Id.
The court pointed out that existence of separate markets for beef and beef by-products
makes it difficult to determine the extent to which middlemen relied on by-product
revenues to subsidize absorbed declines in beef. Id.
87. In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 639 (5th Cir. 1981); Phillips
v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 633, 634 n.4 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 761 (10th
Cir. 1981) cert. denied, sub nom. Zinser v. Palmby, - U.S . 5 CCH Trade Cases,
1 60,021 (February 22, 1982); Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.,
596 F.2d 573, 578 n.9 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Mid-West Milk Monopolization, 529 F. Supp.
1326, 1337 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808,
819 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). But see, In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 516 F.
Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981) (exceptions enumerated in Illinois Brick not exclusive).
88. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
89. Id., at 736, n.13.
90. On remand in the district court, the defendants presented empirical data
which establishel beyond question that a defendant's "Yellow Sheet" price list was
not an index of a reasonably precise pricing formula and hence nothing more than
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problems of tracing, noting that such rules are not rigidly adhered
to and may vary to reflect demand conditions."
Far from confining exceptions to the direct purchaser rule, the
Fifth Circuit's open-ended standard expands immeasurably the uni-
verse of transactions which may be denominated the "functional
equivalent" of a cost-plus contract and hence licenses creative pleading
of indirect purchasers' "proffered fantasies."92 For example, contrary
a "rule of thumb." In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases
64,815 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
91. Id., at 744. On remand in Beef Industry, the district court, in granting de-
fendants' motions for summary judgment following extensive discovery of "pre-existing
cost-plus contract" issue, held that middlemen in purchasing from plaintiffs did not
employ rigid pricing formulae which superseded market forces but rather utilized mere
cost-based rules of thumb which had been eschewed by the Illinois Brick holding. In
re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 64,815 (N.D. Tex.
1982). The district court on remand thus came to the same conclusion as the district
court had originally 'on defendants' motion against the complaint pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(c).
In light of this fact one cannot help but question the wisdom of the Fifth Circuit
in reversing the initial lower court determination in favor of the defendants in the
first place. Arguably the Fifth Circuit's ruling can be justified on the grounds that
since the motion was directed against the complaint, there was no evidentiary record
through which one could delineate arrangements which superseded market forces from
arrangements which were merely cost-based rules of thumb. By contrast, in Illinois
Brick, the appellate courts had been favored with fully developed evidentiary records
upon which to base their decisions.
However, this highly technical argument is too narrow a ground to justify the
Fifth Circuit holding and serves only to underscore the foundation of sand upon which
the functional equivalent standard was erected. The Fifth Circuit could have just as
easily affirmed the lower court on authority of Illinois Brick in that the transactions
in question (1) did not fall within the two narrow exceptions enunciated in Illinois
Brick; (2) were closely akin to kinds of cost based rules of thumb specifically rejected
by that decision; and (3) would involve the courts in precisely the kinds of intricate
and complex analysis of price/output decisions which the Supreme Court had held lower
courts should not undertake and were ill-equipped to handle. Had the Fifth Circuit
merely affirmed on the basis of Illinois Brick instead of encouraging plaintiffs to em-
bark on a mission that was doomed to fail from the start, the parties and the district
court would have been relieved from an incredible and altogether unnecessary burden
of establishing or rebutting "functional equivalence," and other courts would have been
spared from a most confusing and unsound precedent.
92. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases,
64,815 (N.D. Tex. 1982). There is no limit to the types of transactions that creative
counsel may seek to fit within the rubric of functional equivalent.
Perhaps the most far-fetched claim of functional equivalence was put forth by
the Antitrust Division in United States v. Pfizer, Inc., 1980-81 CCH Trade Cases
1 63,801 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the civil phase of the government's action in In re Antibiotics
Antitrust Actions. The government, having failed to prove a price-fixing conspiracy
in a prior criminal action, United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 281 F. Supp. 837
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to Illinois Brick," the functional equivalent standard does not require
that any "cost-plus" contract between the middleman and the indirect
purchaser be fixed in quantity. 4 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit formulation
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd by equally divided Court, 404
U.S. 548 (1972), on remand, 367 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), brought a civil suit for
damages pursuant to S 4A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15a, alleging a conspiracy
to exclude competition in the production and sale of tetracycline and analogue broad
spectrum antibiotics in violation of S 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1.
The government claimed overcharges as a direct purchaser and also as an in-
direct "purchaser" through various federal programs, including Medicaid and Medicare.
It was the latter claims that fell within the Illinois Brick bar. The government was
not even in the chain of distribution under either Medicare or Medicaid; rather it
acted as a reimburser of in-patient health care providers under Medicare, and a reim-
burser of reimbursers (the states) to out-patient health care providers under Medicaid.
Despite the fact the government did not buy any of the drugs in question under these
programs, the Justice Department nevertheless urged that since reimbursement under
both Medicare and Medicaid was governed by a series of federal and state regula-
tions, the United States had established the functional equivalent of a cost-plus contract.
The government's "functional equivalent" argument conveniently ignored the
following points, any one of which would be fatal: (1) the government was not a purchas-
er, but only a reimburser of health care providers; (2) there was no contract pre-existing
or otherwise between the government and any purchaser in the chain of distribution;
(3) afortiori, there was no cost-plus contract; (4) even if a regulation could be viewed
as a pre-existing cost-plus contract, the Medicaid regulations varied widely from state
to state, and thus there was no mechanism to "make it easy" to determine the level
of any overcharge; and (5) the government had no proof whatsoever of how much was
expended under Medicare and Medicaid for tetracycline and related drugs.
Notwithstanding the numerous fatal shortcomings in the government's theory,
the trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Medicare and
Medicaid claims. However, all government claims were eventually dismissed. United
States v. Pfizer, Inc., 1980-81 CCH Trade Cases 63,801 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 1982-1
CCH Trade Cases, 1 64,578 (3d Cir. 1982).
93. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977 Mid-West Paper Products
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 1979); Lefrak v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
94. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163-67 (5th Cir.
1979). On remand, the district court pointed out this anomaly and acknowledged some
difficulty in "squaring functional equivalence with the rulings of the Supreme Court."
In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, S 64,815 (N.D. Tex.
1982). In line with Illinois Brick and contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the district court
found that to be within the exception to the Illinois Brick rule, a pre-existing cost-
plus contract must be fixed in quantity:
A cost-plus contract has three elements: (1) a preexisting contract,
(2) specifying a fixed quantity of products to be sold, (3) with the price
per unit to be determined by an agreed-upon markup to the seller's own
cost. Recent Development, A Door in the Illinois Brick Wall-A Functional
Equivalent to the Cost-Plus Contract Exception. 33 VAND. L. REv. 481 (1980).
When parties agree to a cost-plus contract, the indirect purchaser's price
can be easily determined arithmetically once the middleman's costs are
known. The middleman is not at risk and neither profits nor loses when
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is so broad that the cost-plus exception threatens to swallow the direct
purchaser rule and become the rule itself. 5
b. The "Functional Equivalent" Standard Will Re-Introduce
the Very Problems that Illinois Brick Was Designed to Remedy
The Court in Illinois Brick clearly envisioned that the passing
on theory may be used, offensively or defensively, only when an ar-
rangement circumvents complex market transactions which makes it
"easy to prove that the [direct purchaser] has not been damaged,"
and underscored the need for courts to avoid becoming enmeshed in
sorting out price-output decisions." The functional equivalent test does
not in every-and indeed may not in any-case permit circumvention
of the market mechanism. The district court decision on remand in
Beef Industry enumerates the types of price-output decisions in which
the trial courts will routinely become embroiled under the functional
equivalent standard; such issues include, inter alia: (1) individual pur-
chaser's needs and adequacy of inventory; (2) fixed costs; (3) com-
petitive bidding and negotiation process; (4) quality of the product
to be purchased; (5) market conditions; (6) opportunity costs; (7)
adherence to cost-based pricing formulae; and (8) absorption of price
increments by middlemen.97 These varied complex factors affecting
pricing create the very type of uncertainty precluded by Illinois
Brick." Since such issues will inevitably arise in chain of distribution
cases, the functional equivalent standard will ineluctably clash with
Illinois Brick and hence serves no legitimate purpose.
the cost to him changes. Rather, he increases or decreases the charge
to his customer without ever absorbing a loss or gaining a profit.
Because the price is fully negotiated in advance of any transactions
under a cost-plus contract, (i the middleman need not make any judgments
about supply and demand or other changeable conditions in the market;
(ii) the middleman's price does not react to the pressures of competition;
and (iii) the price does not change as the result of day-to-day negotiation
with his customer. Finally, in a cost-plus contract, the relationship be-
tween the selling price and the costs to which it is tied will always re-
main fixed.
95. Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, sub. nom. Zinser v. Palmby, __ U.S. - , 5 CCH Trade Cases 1 60,021
(February 22, 1982); see, In re Beef Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases
64,815 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("Presumably [functionall equivalency must be demonstrated
without resort to the kinds of proof and simplifying assumptions rejected by the very
confinement of the exception to a cost-plus type contract.")
96. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
97. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases 64,815
(N.D. Tex. 1982).
98. Id.
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Moreover, as noted above, the Beef Industry holding did not re-
quire that the cost-plus contract specify fixed quantities to be pur-
chased. Where the supposed "cost-plus" contract does not specify a
fixed quantity of goods, damages cannot be determined "in advance
without reference to the laws of supply and demand."99 The direct
purchaser may well suffer antitrust injury through loss of sales to
its customers due to increased prices and seek damages for its losses."
This creates a situation whereby damages have to be apportioned be-
tween plaintiffs at two different points in the chain of distribution
(the direct purchaser and the direct purchaser's customer).' °1 Such ap-
portionment among all potential plaintiffs which might have absorbed
part of the overcharges cannot be accomplished without being em-
broiled in "the uncertainties and difficulties of analyzing price and
output decisions"'' 2 which would "add whole new dimensions of com-
plexity to treble damages suits and seriously undermine their
effectiveness." ' "Functional equivalence" is not a talisman which
makes the enormous practical difficulties in unravelling indirect pur-
chaser claims disappear.
In ruling that the functional equivalent of a pre-existing cost-
plus contract need not specify a fixed quantity, the Fifth Circuit missed
the thrust of the Illinois Brick holding."4 Notwithstanding the clear
language of Illinois Brick, the Fifth Circuit stated:
99. Id.
100. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580
(3d Cir. 1979); Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
101. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977).
102. Id. at 731-32.
103. Id. at 737.
104. The Court in Illinois Brick sought to harmonize the two primary and often
conflicting goals of antitrust enforcement-deterrence of future violations and com-
pensation of victims-by holding that the private antitrust enforcement mechanism
could be best effectuated by allowing only those plaintiffs who had dealt directly with
the price-fixers to sue for treble damages. See, In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,
1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 64,815 (N.D. Tex. 1982). Finding that to permit indirect
purchasers to sue would complicate antitrust actions and hence hinder rather than
further the treble damages remedy, the Court thus struck the balance in favor of
deterrence, conceding that some indirect purchaser-plaintiffs who were actually injured
would by its decision be denied a claim for relief.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in Beef Industry seemed to stress compensation
over deterrence and provided victims of a monopsonistic price-fixing scheme with every
opportunity to go to trial, even through proof at trial would entail the very kind of
complexity the prior holding in Illinois Brick found unacceptable. As the district court
on remand pointed out, "squaring functional equivalence with the rulings of the Supreme
Court gives [the court] pause." In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH
Trade Cases, 1 64,815 (N.D. Tex. 1982). The Fifth Circuit's functional equivalent stan-
dard cannot be easily reconciled with Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.
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Functional equivalence is not lost simply because the
proponent of passing-on theory cannot demonstrate that the
middleman suffered no loss in volume as the result of rais-
ing the price to his customers. In the cost-plus contract itself,
the middleman is likely to have suffered a loss of volume and
hence profits as a result of the overcharge. His higher sell-
ing price will likely have caused potential customers to
forego his product. See Note, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 329
n.87. The middleman's loss of volume and the indirect pur-
chaser's absorption of the overcharge are wholly separable
items of damage.'
The court's statement that a middleman is likely to lose volume
as a result of the overcharge even in the cost-plus situation is simply
not true where the cost-plus contract is pre-existing and requires fix-
ed quantities to be purchased. 6 In that case, the indirect purchaser
is locked-in to a given quantity and the middleman cannot suffer any
loss in volume. Even though the middleman's loss of volume and the
indirect purchaser's absorption of any overcharge are theoretically
"wholly separable items of damage,"10 7 in situations where the cost-
plus contract does not fix quantity it was the practical problem of
tracing and apportioning the overcharges which led the Court in
Illinois Brick to rule as it ruled. 8
The functional equivalent standard thus puts the courts right
105. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1164 (5th Cir. 1979)
(emphasis added).
106. Not only did the Fifth Circuit err in interpreting Illinois Brick on the need
to have a fixed-quantity pre-existing cost-plus contract, but it compounded the error
in a lengthy explanatory footnote. The court found that Illinois Brick overruled its
prior holding, Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied., 429 U.S. 1094 (1977), which held that the passing on defense
is unavailable absent a showing that the direct purchaser suffered no harm through
lost sales volume, even if the direct purchaser in fact passed on 100/o of the over-
charge. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1164 n.20 (5th Cir.
1979). The Fifth Circuit expressed incredulity at the logical inference to be drawn
from the Yoder holding, i.e., that if a defendant is barred from using passing on
defensively because there is no showing of a pre-existing fixed-quantity cost-plus con-
tract, then the indirect purchaser-plaintiff in the same case is barred from asserting
passing on offensively. Id. This symmetry is at the heart of the Illinois Brick holding.
The court further observed that Yoder effectively eliminated the passing on defense,
except perhaps in the "very narrow case of the pre-existing, fixed-quantity cost-plus
contract." Id. This proposition, of course, is the very essence of the Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick holdings.
107. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
108. See supra notes 35-37.
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back into the thicket of unravelling complex market transactions and
can hardly be said to make it "easy to prove" that the direct pur-
chasers have not been damaged. The Fifth Circuit curiously cited no
cases to support its extension of the pre-existing cost-plus contract
exception to cover functional equivalents of such arrangements.
Rather, it relied primarily on the rather questionable analyses of
"commentators."'10 9
c. Multiple Liability, Duplicative Recoveries
and Inconsistent Judgments
In resurrecting the tracing and apportionment issues, the holding
in Beef Industry is pregnant with potential for multiple liability,
duplicative recoveries and inconsistent judgments. Once a claim for
relief is placed in the hands of several parties in the same chain of
distribution, the defendant may be forced to pay, two or more times,
the full amount of damages caused by its alleged wrongdoing trebled
and thus face "ruinous liability," far in excess of any harm inflicted
by any illegal acts."' At the same time, it is possible that different
courts, on the same set of facts, may reach different results in suits
by direct purchasers on the one hand and by indirect purchasers on
the other hand."' For the reasons set forth in Illinois Brick, the risk
of inconsistent judgments and the resulting proliferation of confusing
judicial precedents is unacceptable.
d. Promotion of Remote Claims
Perhaps the most mischievous aspect of the Beef Industry de-
cision is that it licenses prosecution of the very type of marginal
claims, far removed from the wrongdoing, which the Supreme Court
held did not give rise to "injury" within the meaning of section 4
of the Clayton Act.' 2 Indirect purchasers may be able to resurrect
claims vitiated by Illinois Brick by pleading "functional equivalence"
together with a few rudimentary allegations of wrongdoing."' Because
109. The court specifically cited two law review pieces, both student-prepared
notes, neither of which can be deemed authoritative in light of the contrary views
expressed by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick, which both notes purport to analyze.
110. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31, 740, 745 (1977).
111. Id. at 730-31.
112. See, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728, n.7.
113. The Fifth Circuit held:
The complaints sufficiently allege that the impact of the retail chains'
price changes upon the pricing decisions of the packers is determined in
advance without regard to the interactions of supply and demand. The
plaintiffs allege that the packers set the price of live cattle by strictly
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the functional equivalent standard makes it nearly impossible to
dismiss an indirect purchaser's complaint on its face, defendants are
thus forced to incur substantial legal fees and suffer diversion in man-
power during prolonged discovery on the complicated "functional
equivalent" issue. As legal expenses mount up, it may become more
economical to settle such marginal claims rather than pay the cost
of defending them. 114 While it is likely that many indirect purchasers
would have suffered some real injury, there is also a great danger
that under the "functional equivalent" theory, defendants will become
hostage of remote but aggressive plaintiffs with claims of dubious
merit. At the same time, the functional equivalent rule holds out false
applying certain formulae to the Yellow Sheet or Safeway wholesale beef
price. Under these allegations a plaintiff would be entitled, once he proved
what the competitive wholesale price would have been for a given grade
of beef in a given region at a given time, and once he established that
the packer to whom he sold strictly applied a formula to the Yellow Sheet
price for the particular sale, to damages in the amount of the difference
between the price he actually received on that sale of fat cattle and the
price he would have received absent price-fixing (computed by applying
the packer's formula to the constructed competitive wholesale price). The
packer's habitual use of predetermined formulae would enable measure-
ment of the effect on prices for fat cattle of changes in wholesale prices.
The plaintiffs have alleged the functional equivalent of cost-plus contracts.
In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1165 (5th Cir. 1979).
The elements of proof to establish the "functional equivalent of a pre-existing
cost-plus contract as enunciated by the Fifth Circuit are significant for what they do
not require. First, the court of appeals makes no mention of the need for a formal,
pre-existing contractural arrangement. But see, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 609 F.2d 497, 498 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) ("Implicit in the In re Beef Industry
holding and still the required minimum under Hanover Shoe is the necessity of a preexist-
ing cost-plus contract or its functional equivalent"); In re Plywood Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 655 F.2d 627, 647 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Appellants here never attempted to conform
their allegations to the requirements of Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick, even in the face
of defendant's motion for summary judgment. Despite deposition testimony taken from
dozens of witnesses with both direct and indirect buying experience, appellants do
not cite a single example of functional equivalence of a pre-existing cost-plus
contract. ... )
Secondly, under the Fifth Circuit holding in Beef Industry, there is no require-
ment that the quantity to be purchased be set forth in advance. Id. at 1164, n.20.
But see, In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, I 64,815,n.7
(N.D. Tex. 1982) (to be within the pre-existing cost-plus contract exception, the arrange-
ment must fix in advance the quantities to be purchased). See supra note 94.
114. Indirect purchasers have been permitted to share in settlement funds. E.g.,
In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation American Poultry, 669 F.2d 228, 238 (9th Cir. 1982)
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing indirect purchaser-plaintiffs to share
in the settlement fund where there was evidence that such plaintiffs might be within
the "pre-existing cost-plus contract exception" and the "ownership or control excep-
tion"); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (2d Cir. 1971).
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hopes for indirect purchaser-plaintiffs, for while such plaintiffs can
escape motions directed against the complaint with relative ease, the
exacting standard of proof set by the Fifth Circuit is virtually im-
possible to meet.115 Indirect purchasing plaintiffs are therefore likely
to find themselves out of court eventually even under the functional
equivalent doctrine, but only after futilely spending large sums of
money to prosecute their indirect claims.
In sum, Beef Industry was wrongly decided. The Fifth Circuit
has re-examined and redetermined issues on which the Supreme Court
reached opposite conclusions and created a dangerously broad ex-
ception which far exceeds the narrow scope of the pre-existing cost-
plus contract exception enunciated in Illinois Brick. The Illinois Brick
holding may well be considered harsh in certain individual cases, but
its fundamental aims-to encourage aggressive enforcement of an-
titrust laws by parties in the best position to sue (first purchasers)
and to avoid the needless complexity which is inherent in suits where
plaintiffs include direct and indirect purchasers-will be continually
frustrated unless lower courts strictly adhere to its clear-cut holding.
B. The "Ownership or Control" Exception Post-Illinois Brick
The cases construing the ownership or control exception are
sparse. The handful of lower courts which have had occasion to deal
with the ownership or control issue have, with perhaps one notable
exception,' construed this exception narrowly, evidently mindful of
115. See supra note 113.
116. The apparent exception is the somewhat bizarre holding in Royal Printing,
Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980), wherein the Ninth Circuit
turned the "ownership or control" exception sideways, if not on its head.
Plaintiffs in Royal Printing allegedly brought price-fixed paper from wholesalers
who had in turn purchased from the defendants, but admittedly did not buy directly
from any of the defendant-manufacturers. Plaintiffs claimed to have bought paper from
the wholesaling division of defendant Crown-Zellerbach but conceded that none of the
products so purchased was manufactured by Crown-Zellerbach; rather such products
were manufacturerd by other co-conspirator defendants. In addition, plaintiffs bought
paper from Butler Paper Co., a subsidiary of defendant -Great Northern Nekooso. Again,
the plaintiffs conceded that the paper purchased from Butler was not a product of
Great Northern Nekooso, but was a product of other co-conspiring defendants.
The court, acknowledging that the "ownership or control" exception articulated
in Illinois Brick did not apply, nevertheless held that "Illinois Brick does not bar an
indirect purchaser's suit where the direct purchaser is a division or subsidiary of a
co-conspirator." 621 F.2d at 326. Building on the ownership or control exception author-
ized by Illinois Brick, the court created a hybird exception which creates the pitfalls
the Illinois Brick decision sought to avoid.
Those pitfalls are avoided under properly invoked ownership or control exceptions.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/1
1983] ILLINOIS BRICK
Illinois Brick's emphasis upon the limited scope of exemptions to the
indirect purchaser rule."7 There is no definitive "test" for determin-
ing ownership or control; but, from the Supreme Court's use of the
disjunctive, it appears that a party may bring itself within the ex-
ception if either ownership or control can be proven." 8
The question of ownership can be determined in a straight-
forward fashion through discovery, either by interrogatories or de-
positions. Ownership clearly contemplates an equity interest, but how
extensive must the equity interest be to constitute "ownership?" Clear-
ly, holding 100% of the stock of a corporation unquestionably qualifies
as ownership; holding a majority of shares probably does;' 9 holding
enough shares to elect a majority of the board of directors may qualify
as ownership; 2 ' holding one or two per cent of the shares probably
would not be considered ownership.
As previously discussed, the rationale for that exception is that where the price-fixing
seller owns or controls the first purchaser or the indirect purchaser owns or controls
the first seller, market forces are superseded and complex problems of tracing and
price-output adjustments do not arise. In other words, the transaction between the
price-fixing seller and the controlled first purchaser is not really a sale.
The transactions upon which the plaintiffs in Royal Printing were permitted to
sue were sales, not from manufacturer to controlled first purchaser to plaintiff, but
rather from manufacturer to wholesaler (division or subsidiary of co-conspirator) to
plaintiffs. In the former case, one may fairly assume that no bona fide sale took place;
but in the latter case-where co-conspirators are dealing inter se- that assumption
does not hold up, since there is no reason to assume that conspirators will not deal
with one another at arms length. Indeed, the court so conceded, stating that "the
wholesalers' pricing decisions are determined by market forces; therefore, footnote
16 [the ownership or control exception] is not applicable. 621 F.2d at 326, n.4.
Consequently, when conspirator A deals with the subsidiary of conspirator B,
which in turn deals with the plaintiff, the very same problems identified in Illinois
Brick-tracing and price-output decisions-arise in plaintiff's suit for alleged over-
charges from price-fixing. The very type of action permitted by the court in Royal
Printing is precisely the type of proceeding Illinois Brick refused to sanction. The
holding is ill-conceived, poorly reasoned and will serve only to divert the talents of
creative plaintiffs' lawyers into futile assaults on the Illinois Brick citadel.
117. E.g., Jewish Hospital Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical Enterprises, Inc., 628
F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, (1981); In re Mid-West Paper Pro-
ducts Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 589 (3d Cir. 1979); Technical Learn-
ing Cooperative v. DBAG, 1980-81 CCH Trade Cases, 1 63,612 (D. Md. 1980).
118. See, Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers
in Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 328 n.83.
119. It is likely that owning a majority would constitute "control," even if it
did not constitute ownership.
120. Voting control of a corporation refers to the power to elect a majority of
the Board of Directors. Such control of course may be accomplished even if one owns
substantially less than a majority of the voting shares. The more widely dispersed
the ownership of voting shares, the less one needs to exert de facto control of the
corporation.
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Establishing "control" is another matter, for one company may
control another in ways other than by stock ownership. 2 ' Thus, when
alleging "control" as opposed to "ownership" the plaintiff has more
leeway as to the type of proof that might be developed. At the same
time, the courts must be wary of attempts by the parties to transform
resolution of such a threshold issue into a minitrial involving "massive
evidence and complicated theories" of the very kind Illinois Brick was
determined to avoid. 22
Several barebones tests governing the application of the owner-
ship or control exception have been articulated by the lower courts.'
2 3
While the criteria vary slightly in each of these cases, it is clear that
the inquiry into the ownership or control issue is essentially factual
in nature which must be explored on discovery, preferably at the early
stages in the proceedings so that the plaintiffs' credentials are clear-
ly resolved long prior to trial.
Whatever legal test is followed, the courts must be careful to
avoid applying the "ownership or control" exception in a manner which
creates a serious risk of multiple liability to the defendants. As
previously discussed, the "ownership or control" exception may apply
in two distinct situations: (1) where the first purchaser is owned or
controlled by the defendant; and (2) where the first purchaser is owned
or controlled by the indirect purchaser. 2 " In the former case, it is
121. A company may exert control over another company by virtue of its pos-
ition as a dominant creditor. Control may also be exercised by virtue of a superior
economic and bargaining power. See, In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,
497 F. Supp. 218, 227 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
122. See, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742 (1977) quoting Hanover
Shoe Corp. v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968).
123. Jewish Hospital Ass'n. v. Stewart Mechanical Enterprises, Inc., 628 F.2d
971, 977 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981) ("... the 'control' exception
is limited to relationships involving such functional economic or other unity between
the direct purchaser and either the defendant or the indirect purchaser that there
effectively has been only one sale. "); Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental
Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 589 (3d Cir. 1979) ("... when the parent dominates and
controls the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary is deemed an agent of
the parent."); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1162 (5th Cir.
1979) (Control is established "either through acquisition of stock or indirectly through
various financial arrangements, including credit," citing In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 195 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974)Y In re Petroleum
Products Antitrust Litigation, 497 F. Supp. 218, 227 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ("The question
of how much control is required to meet the exception cannot be decided until a fac-
tual record is developed. The degree of ownership, profit taking, or ability to set prices
will be important considerations in determining whether the intermediate seller is
'controlled.' ").
124. See supra text accompanying notes 43-56.
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possible that the controlled first purchaser might bring suit against
the price-fixing seller, but highly unlikely. In the latter case, the
possibility of a suit by the first purchaser-not owned or controlled
by the seller but rather by the ultimate purchaser-is much more
realistic. To avoid the double recovery argument, the plaintiff could
simply make the first purchaser (which it owns or controls) a co-plain-
tiff, enabling the courts to resolve all disputes in one action.
125
In sum, the law has been slow to develop on the "ownership or
control" exception. The key question is whether the middleman is so
dominated that one can say only one transaction has taken place and
passing on is therefore not a concern. Of course, situations where the
control argument can be raised are much less frequent than situa-
tions where one might claim a cost-plus contract or its functional
equivalent. The primary battleground in the passing on sphere has
been and remains in the pre-existing cost-plus contract sphere.
C. The So-Called "Co-Conspirator" Exception to
the Rule of Illinois Brick
Several lower courts have held that in addition to the two ex-
ceptions explicity identified in Illinois Brick, a third implicit excep-
tion exists where the defendant seller and first purchaser have con-
spired to fix the price of goods sold to the first purchaser's
customers.126 The analyses of this purported exception vary con-
siderably depending on whether or not the alleged co-conspirator-first
purchaser is named as a defendant by the plaintiff-indirect purchaser.
1. Middleman Named as a Co-Conspirator And Defendant
Where the plaintiff-indirect purchaser is named as a co-conspiring
defendant, the concerns of Illinois Brick are not implicated, for in
125. Alternatively, the court might force a recalcitrant plaintiff-indirect purchaser
to join its seller (the direct purchaser) by granting a defendant's motion to dismiss
unless plaintiff joins its seller within a specified period of time. If the seller declines
to sue on its own and is named as a party-defendant by plaintiff, the court may re-
align the parties pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 19 to reflect their true interests.
126. See, Jewish Hospital Ass'n. v. Stewart Mechanical Enterprises, Inc., 628
F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Fontana Aviation Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,
600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,
516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn.
1980); Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Atkiegesellschaft, 1980-81,
CCH Trade Cases 63,612 (D. Md. 1980); Dart Drug Co., v. Corning Glass Works,
480 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1979); see also, Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 512
F. Supp. 108, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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such a case, the problem of passing on is not raised."' Rather, the
situation presented is a classic vertical price-fixing conspiracy, resale
price maintenance.12 Thus, if the first purchaser is a partner in crime
with the price-fixing original seller, there should be no concern about
"passing on." We need not trace the overcharge through the chain
of distribution; the illegal price in such a case is not that charged
by the original seller to the first purchaser but rather the price joint-
ly imposed by the conspiring seller and first purchaser on the latter's
customers." Unlike the classic passing on case as exemplified by
Illinois Brick, the middleman is a conspirator, not merely an in-
termediate functionary able to pass along any overcharges because
of prevailing economic conditions or market power.
However, the courts must be alert to distinguish those situations
in which there is a true basis for alleging a vertical conspiracy from
those in which vertical conspiracy is alleged merely to avoid the limita-
tions of Illinois Brick.3' Obviously, there is great potential for abuse
in a rule which says that an indirect purchaser may sue if it names
its seller and its seller's seller as defendants-co-conspiratorsdhut may
not sue if no conspiracy is alleged.' Early, focused discovery efforts
and appropriate summary judgment or partial summary judgment mo-
tions will serve to delineate the bona fide vertical conspiracy claims
from those designed to evade Illinois Brick on indirect purchaser
suits.'32
2. Middleman Named as a Co-Conspirator
But Not as a Defendant
In the situation where a vertical conspiracy between the original
seller and the middleman is alleged but the middleman is not joined
as a defendant, the lower courts are split as to whether an indirect
purchaser should be permitted to proceed on the vertical conspiracy
127. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (D.
Md. 1981).
128. Id. at n.18.
129. Id. at 1295; see Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 108,
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
130. See In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir.
1979).
131. Such a rule would encourage the indirect purchaser-plaintiff to allege ver-
tical conspiracies even where none existed, in order to avoid dismissal on Illinois Brick
.grounds.
132. See In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1149, 1166 (5th Cir.
1979).
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theory.1" Unfortunately, there has been a dearth of hard legal analysis
of this issue, particularly in cases where the courts have recognized
the exception.
The argument for requiring the co-conspirator to be named as
a defendant in order to invoke the co-conspirator exception parallels
the argument in opposition to the umbrella theory wherein the plain-
tiff seeks to recover overcharges from a price fixer based on purchas-
es from non-defendants. 34 It is arguable that in such a situation, the
defendant faces multiple liability for the same alleged wrongdoing;
thus, the defendant may be sued by the indirect purchaser-plaintiff
and subsequently by the unnamed defendant and be forced to pay
treble damages in. amounts far in excess of any ill-gotten gains.13 This
situation is quite different from the situation where the alleged co-
conspirators are named as defendants and the rights of all those
potentially liable to the defendants can be adjudicated in one
proceeding.13
The rejoinder to this argument is that the claim of potential
multiple liability is more illusory than real in that (1) the co-conspiring
middleman would be unlikely to sue his seller and (2) the co-conspiring
middleman would be barred from suing the defendant seller under
the in pari delicto doctrine set forth in Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts, Corp.1 3
7
133. Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Atkiegesellschaft, 1980-81
CCH Trade Cases, 63,612 (D. Md. 1980).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 188-220.
135. See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir.
1979); Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 586 (3d
Cir. 1979); Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Atkiegesellschaft, 1980-81
CCH Trade Cases, 63,612 (D. Md. 1980); Dart Drug Co. v. Corning Glass Works,
480 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1979).
136. Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Atkiegesellschaft, 1980-81
CCH Trade Cases, 63,612 (D. Md. 1980).
137. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). In Perma-Life, the Supreme Court held that the in pari
delicto defense could not be invoked where the plaintiff co-conspirator had been com-
pelled by the defendant to participate in the alleged conspiracy. The Court did not
rule on the question of whether the plaintiff might be barred where there is "truly
complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme .. .wholly apart
from the idea of in in pari delicto." Id. at 140; ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
at 297-98.
However, as subsequent lower court cases have pointed out, at least five members
of the Court were of the view that the defense would be available under such cir-
cumstances. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 902
(5th Cir. 1979); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1295
(D. Md. 1981).
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The court in In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation3 '
resolved the argument by developing the following analytical
framework for cases where the vertical conspiracy is alleged between
the defendant seller and an unnamed allegedly co-conspiring
middleman:139
a. Review whether permitting an indirect purchaser-plaintiff to
sue would run afoul of Illinois Brick by (1) creating problems of trac-
ing or (2) create a risk of multiple liability for defendants. As previous-
ly noted, 4 ' there is generally no tracing problem but there may be
a problem of multiple liability.
b. Review the co-conspirator's alleged participation in the con-
spiracy. If the in pari delicto defense would be applicable, the suit
may proceed without naming the alleged co-conspirator as defendant,
since there could be no multiple liability. If the in pari delicto defense
would not pertain, then the suit on a "co-conspirator exception" theory
would be barred, unless the alleged co-conspirator were named as a
defendant.
Hence, where the indirect purchaser-plaintiff alleges that the un-
named co-conspirator-direct-purchaser was a substantially equal part-
ner in the wrongdoing with the initial seller and thus subject to the
in pari delicto defense, the complaint should withstand a motion to
dismiss.' Where plaintiff claims that there was a vertical price-fixing
conspiracy, the better practice would be to name any and all alleged
co-conspirators as co-defendants and thereby obviate any argument
that the defendant is being exposed to possible multiple liability. No
such claim can be raised, provided all possible first-purchasers to whom
defendant might arguably be liable are joined as defendants-
co-conspirators.
To summarize, where the first purchaser and the antitrust
violator are participants in a vertical price-fixing conspiracy, the key
issue raised in Illinois Brick-passing on- is not present, since the
conspiratorial price is not that charged by the seller to the first
purchaser but rather the price jointly imposed on the indirect-
138. 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981).
139. Id.
140. See supri text accompanying notes 127-37.
141. The issue of the direct purchaser's participation in any alleged conspiracy
can be explored in the early stages of discovery. If the price-fixing initial seller can
adduce proof during discovery that the direct purchaser was not a participant in the
claimed conspiracy, the court should entertain a motion for summary judgment dismiss-
ing the indirect purchaser claims as barred under Illinois Brick.
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purchaser plaintiff by the co-conspiring seller and first purchaser.
Where all alleged co-conspirators are named in the complaint, neither
of the primary concerns of Illinois Brick-tracing and potential multi-
ple liability-are encountered. Where less than all co-conspirators are
named as defendants, it is arguable that the defendant may face multi-
ple liability. Defendant would not face such liability where the un-
named conspirator is subject to the in pari delicto defense as against
that defendant; i.e., where the unnamed conspirator is a true member
of the conspiracy. However, the multiple liability argument can be
eliminated if the indirect purchaser-plaintiff names all the alleged co-
conspirators as defendants.
V. EXTENSIONS OF THE Illinois Brick HOLDING
BEYOND THE "PASSING ON" ISSUE: STANDING
The rule of Illinois Brick barring plaintiff's proof of passing on is
one of three judicially created antitrust doctrines designed to limit
the class of plaintiffs who might bring treble damages actions;" 2 the
others are "antitrust injury" ' and "standing".'" Each of these doc-
trines addresses different aspects of the problem of deciding when
a person is "injured in his business or property""'  under section 4
of the Clayton Act.' While these doctrines are in some sense
analytically distinct,' 7 at the same time, they are functionally akin,
142. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 582
(5th Cir. 1979); Pollock v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc.,
512 F. Supp. 711, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
143. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (anti-
trust injury is the "injury of the type of the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendant's acts unlawful"); see, Calvani, The
Mushrooming Brunswick Defense: Injury to Competition, Not to Plaintiff, 50 ANTITRUST
L.J. 319, 320-24 (1982).
144. E.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn
Productions, 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971); Malamud
v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials
and Equipment Corp., 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976); Pollock v. Citrus Associates of the
New York Cotton Exchange, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 711, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980, Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
145. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 582
(3d Cir. 1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp.
1246, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
146. 15 U.S.C. S 15.
147. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 582
(3d Cir. 1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp.
1246, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Nevertheless, courts have questioned the meaningfulness,
if not correctness, of such distinctions. E.g., Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin
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since together they comprise the mechanism through which "the courts
have patrolled the portals to a treble damages action.""' 8 Consequent-
ly, it is not suprising that despite the rather specific focus of the
Illinois Brick holding to passing on issues in a single chain of
distribution,I9 the lower courtss' have looked to the broader signif-
icance of that decision and applied its rationale to resolve questions
of standing in treble damages actions.'1
5
Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, any person "injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws"'52 may bring a treble damages action against the alleged violator.
Read literally, section 4 would authorize suits for threefold damages
by almost anyone claiming ill effects from a purported antitrust viola-
tion, regardless of how far removed the plaintiff might be from the
illegal conduct." Notwithstanding the apparent limitless sweep of sec-
tion 4, the lower courts "have been virtually unanimous in concluding
that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy
in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to anti-
National Bank, 445 F. Supp. 965, 968-69 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (The analytical distinction
between "standing" and "injury" "presents somewhat of an anomaly," and such an
interpretation contradicts other Supreme Court decisions on standing); Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1982) (the distinctions between the con-
cepts of standing and antitrust injury are unclear).
148. Id.
149. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
150. E.g., Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. AMAX, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981)
cert. denied, __ U.S. .. 5 CCH Trade Cases 60,021 (March 8, 1982); Reading
Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 916 (1981); see cases cited supra note 144; see, P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, AN-
TITRUST LAW par. 333 (1978).
151. The lower courts have not looked to Illinois Brick on questions of antitrust
injury. Consequently, the discussion of the extension of the Illinois Brick rationale
will focus primarily on standing. The leading case on the issue of antitrust injury has
been, and continues to be, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977).
152. Section 4 of the Clayton Act reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee . ..
153. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581
(3d Cir. 1979); Pollock v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc.,
512 F. Supp. 711, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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trust violation;" ' 4 and while antitrust violations may well create
foreseeable "ripples of injury" throughout the economy, the courts
have not permitted those suffering a mere "ripple effect" to sue under
section 4. ,' The standing limitation,'" a restriction not unlike the
proximate cause doctrine in tort law, '57 is designed to narrow the
universe of antitrust plaintiffs "to those individuals whose protection
is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws."'"
A number of "tests" for standing have been developed under
various rubrics, including "direct injury," ' 9 "target area, "160 "zone of
154. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263, n.14 (1972). See, Blue Shield
of Virginia v. McCready, - U.S. ., 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases 64,791, at 71,882
(1982) (While the Court has "refused to engraft artificial limitations on the § 4 remedy
• . . it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person
tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold
damages for the injury to his business or property.").
155. John- Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 499 (9th Cir.
1977). See also, Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971); Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group,
Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 1979); cf. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,
U.S. __ 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 64,791, at 71,882 ("despite the broad wording
of S 4 there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.")
156. As Professor Areeda points out, the principles underlying the standing limita-
tion include: (1) concern that a given defendant may be subjected to virtually unlimited
liability and that courts would be required to make increasingly speculative deter-
minations of antitrust injury and amount of damages, particularly as plaintiffs become
more and more remote from the actual wrongdoing; (2) courts may be reluctant to
punish an alleged violator who, acting in good faith, committed minor antitrust trans-
gressions, particularly where the plaintiff's injury is a mere ripple effect; (3) courts
may also be reluctant to go through a lengthy and expensive trial at the behest of
a ripple-effect plaintiff; and (4) it is desirable to dismiss remote and insubstantial claims,
which but for the standing limitation might survive a motion to dismiss, on standing
grounds well before trial. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 160, at 80-1 (3d ed. 1981).
157. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) [Brennan, J., dissenting];
see, Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, __ U.S. ., 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases,
1 64,791 at 71,882 (1982).
158. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505
(3d Cir. 1976), quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); see, Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,
U.S. -, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 64,791, at 71,884 (1982) ("As a consumer of
psychotherapy services entitled to financial benefits under the Blue Shield plan, we
think it clear that [plaintiff] was 'within the area of the economy . . . endangered by
[that] break down of competitive conditions' resulting from Blue Shield's selective refusal
to reimburse.").
159. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
160. E.g., California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors
of California, Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1980); Reading Industries, Inc. v. Ken-
necott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); In
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interest,.16 "balancing approach,"'6 2 and hybrids of the foregoing. 63
Under these various "tests," courts have generally denied standing
to employees,' lessors or landlords," 5 suppliers,' stockholders,'67
creditors,' franchisors,'69 patentees, 70 and utility rate-payers... of the
antitrust victim.' 2 On the other hand, courts have granted standing
to shareholders in derivative actions, 73 insurers forced to pay higher
claims due to antitrust activity,'74 and in certain cases, shareholders
re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution MDL No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126-28 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Morgan v. Automobile Manufacturers Assn., 414 U.S. 1045 (1973);
Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
161. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
162. E.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Industires, Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1978); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equip-
ment Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976).
163. E.g., Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. AMAX, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 867 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases 1 60,021 (March 8, 1982)
("direct injury" and "proximate cause").
164. In re Industrial Gas Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases, 64,807 (7th Cir.
1982); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
938 (1973); NAACP v. New York Clearing House Ass'n., 431 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). But see, Ostrofe, v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1982):
The harm to an employee discharged by his employer for refusing
to participate in effectuating an antitrust conspiracy flows immediately,
not remotely or indirectly, from the employer's violation of the Act; it
is neither incidental to nor derivative from injuries done to others. Thus,
there is no more proximate victim who might be better qualified to bring
suit for the damages sustained. [Footnote omitted.]
165. E.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.
454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971).
166. E.g., Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
167. Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970); Ash v. IBM
Corp., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Loeb v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); but see, Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643
F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 102 S.Ct. 388 (1981) (a
shareholder has standing to assert antitrust claims under the "zone of interest" test).
168. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910)
169. E.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
170. SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, Inc., 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
171. Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1963).
172. See generally, ABA ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS at 259-60, n.46; P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER. ANTITRUST LAW, par. 33 (1978).
173. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Funds, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 737 (3d Cir. 1970).
174. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Automotive Service Councils of
Delaware, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 282, 285 (D. Del. 1980).
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themselves.' s However, recent cases have criticized courts' efforts to
pigeon-hole various classes of plaintiffs under "talismanic rubrics" as
foreclosing otherwise meritorious claims "simply because another anti-
trust victim interfaces the relationship between the claimant and the
violator." ' 6
The rules on antitrust standing are frequently difficult to re-
concile, and no bright line rule has emerged from the many conflic-
ting precedents."' Nor has the Supreme Court stepped in to clear
the air. While the Court has apparently approved the concept of stan-
ding to limit the class of potential treble damages plaintiffs,"8 it has
left the lower courts free to map out within very broad guidelines
the appropriate parameters for antitrust standing,'79 and has yet to
decide which of the many standing tests developed by the lower courts
are permissible under section 4 of the Clayton Act.'"
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick expressly declined to ground
its holding on standing principles.' 8' Nevertheless, since the "indirect
175. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, __ U.S. ., 102 S.Ct. 388 (1981).
176. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associate General Contractors of
California, Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 537 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion MDL No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See,
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,.670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982).
177. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 401 (N.D. Il. 1979);
ABA ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS at 260.
178. See, Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, __ U.S. ., 1982-2 CCH Trade
Cases, 64,791, at 71,881 (1982) (Court recognized two types of limitations on the
availability of the S 4 remedy to particular types of persons: (1) where allowing stand-
ing would create a serious risk of double recovery; and (2) where the injury is too
remote from the alleged wrongdoing.). The courts have been less stringent in formulating
standards for standing in actions for injunctions pursuant to S 16 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. S 26. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution Litigation, 481 F.2d 122 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), dismissed on remand, 367 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D.
Cal. 1973), affd, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976).
179. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, __ U.S. __ , 1982-2 CCH Trade
Cases, 1 64,791 (1982); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263, n.14 (1972); Mid-
West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581, n.28 (3d Cir.
1979); D. Berger & R. Bernstein, An Analytical Framework .for Antitrust Standing,
86 YALE L.J. 809, 840-45 (1977).
180. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, __ U.S. __ , 1982-2 CCH Trade
Cases, 1 64,791 at 71,882, n.12 ("we have no occasion here to evaluate the relative
utility of any of these possibly conflicting approaches toward the problem of remote
antitrust injury."); Pollock v. Citrus Associates of New York Cotton Exchange, Inc.,
512 F. Supp. 711, 718, n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
181. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728, n.7 (1977). However, at least
one lower court has held that Illinois Brick restricts standing under the target area test:
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick [sicl v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), if it did not completely
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purchaser" doctrine of Illinois Brick limits antitrust plaintiffs in much
the same way as the standing doctrine'82 and in view of the Supreme
Court's silence on the standing issue, the lower courts have looked
to the rationale of Illinois Brick for guidance in deciding standing
cases.183
The courts have applied the reasoning of Illinois Brick to three
specific situations where an antitrust plaintiff's standing is at issue:
(1) where plaintiff in a price-fixing action claims damages for over-
charges based on purchases from non-defendant, non-conspirators, the
so-called "umbrella theory;"'" (2) where plaintiff brings an antitrust
action alleging market manipulations by the defendants but cannot
prove that he made any purchases at supracompetitive levels from
the defendants;1 8 5 and (3) where several chains of distribution are
involved."
In each instance, the question is whether granting standing would
violate the three basic policy considerations articulated in Illinois
Brick: (1) to prevent injection of complex issues into already complicat-
ed antitrust proceedings; (2) to minimize possibility of multiple liabil-
ity and duplicative recoveries based on the same alleged wrongful
acts; and (3) to avoid impairment of the treble damages remedy.18
A. The Umbrella Theory of Damages
Simply put, the umbrella theory of damages argues that where
reject the target area test, established that being in a target area was
not sufficient to confer standing if factors deleterious to the effective ad-
ministration of the antitrust laws were also present.
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 211, 218 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
182. Pollock v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc., 512
F. Supp. 711, 718 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
183. Id.
184. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580-86
(3d Cir. 1979); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 211, 220 (N.D. Ill.
1980); In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 497 F. Supp. 218, 227-28 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litigation, 530 F. Supp.
36, 38-9 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
185. Strax v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pollock
v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); of, Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. AMAX, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, __ U.S. .. 5 CCH Trade Cases 60,021 (March 8, 1982).
186. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246
(E.D. Pa. 1980); cf. Reading Industries Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981).
187. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246,
1252-55 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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defendants are engaged in a conspiratorial scheme to fix the prices
of goods in which they control a substantial share of sales, their
agreed-upon supracompetitive prices create an umbrella which sup-
ports higher prices by rival non-conspiring sellers who have been freed
of the competitive constraints on their pricing decisions that would
have been exerted but for the conspiracy."'8 Thus, the prices of the
non-conspirators tend to inch up toward the conspiratorial levels and
the buyer is forced to pay supracompetitive prices whether he buys
from a conspirator or a non-conspirator." To illustrate, assume X,
Y and Z, manufacturers of screws, are engaged in a price-fixing ar-
rangement which has set the price of screws at twenty dollars per
unit. A, a competitor of the conspirators but not a party to the illicit
arrangement, can as much as double his price from ten dollars per
unit and still not be out of line with the prices of his rivals, nor face
loss of sales from price-sensitive customers."9 A is able to reap monop-
oly returns without being party to the illicit scheme. A's higher prices
are thus arguably linked to the illegal activity. It makes no difference
to the buyer whether he purchases from a conspirator or a non-
conspirator; either way a supracompetitive price is extracted.
Prior to Illinois Brick, the case law on the umbrella theory was
sparse; but several district court decisions permitted plaintiffs to pro-
ceed on the umbrella theory of damages. 9 ' The Illinois Brick holding,
of course, does not bear directly on this situation, for the plaintiff
here is not an indirect purchaser claiming damages have been passed
on to it, but rather a direct purchaser claiming overcharges that would
not have been imposed but for the defendant's conduct. Thus, no trac-
ing problem would arise. 92
On the other hand, a plaintiff in this situation is somewhat
188. Collecting Overcharges Under the Umbrella Theory, N.Y.L.J. June 16, 1981, p.1 .
189. Plaintiffs have attempted to apply the umbrella theory to overcharge sit-
uations other than those stemming from price-fixing. In United States v. Pfizer Inc.,
1980-81 CCH Trade Cases 63,801 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the government adopted the um-
brella theory in an action where the defendants allegedly engaged in a conspiracy
to exclude competitors and thus drove prices to supracompetitive levels. The action
was dismissed without a determination of the viability of the umbrella theory.
190. It would be only natural for A to raise its prices, given the dispositions
of traders "to follow their most intelligent competitors." See, American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399 (1921).
191. Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851, 863-64 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Wall
Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp 832 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Washington
v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 280 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
192. The measure of damages would be simply the price actually paid less the
price that would have prevailed "but for" the illegal conspiracy.
1983]
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analogous to the indirect purchaser in Illinois Brick-neither deals
directly with the alleged price-fixers. Under the umbrella theory,
defendant is forced to disgorge thrice the ill-gotten gains which ac-
crued to a non-conspiring competitor. Thus, defendants may face
ruinous liability, far exceeding the scope of their wrongdoing. While
no tracing problem as such is presented, there are obvious problems
in determining the extent to which defendants' misconduct caused anti-
trust injury to the plaintiff.
The leading post-Illinois Brick case on the validity of the um-
brella theory is once again Mid-West Paper.193 A plaintiff therein,
Murray's of Baederwood ("Murray's"), sought damages based on its
direct purchases from a non-conspiring competitor of the defendants.194
The Third Circuit, Judge Higginbotham dissenting,"'5 granted de-
fendants' summary judgment motion on the grounds that Murray's
lacked standing. In so holding, the majority cited three key tenets
of Illinois Brick: (a) Murray's proof would involve complex economic
analysis; (b) the defendant might be exposed to multiple liability; and
(c) the effectiveness of the treble damage remedy might be imperiled.1"
1. Complex Economic Analysis
The court found that the price that a non-conspirator would have
charged but for the conspiracy could not be ascertained with
reasonable certainty.'97 The plaintiff would be saddled with the near-
ly impossible burden of proving that the non-conspirator's price rise
was directly caused exclusively by defendants' conduct and not by
other factors."8 As pointed out in Hanover Shoe and discussed above,'"
it would be virtually impossible to say that but for the conspiracy,
193. Mid-West Paper Products, Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580-87
(3d Cir. 1979).
194. Id. at 580-81.
195. Id. at 595 et. seq.
196. Id. at 582-87; In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 497 F. Supp.
212, 227 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See also, Ambook Enterprises v. Time, Inc., 612 F.2d 604,
623 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980) (plaintiffs may not recover from
defendants for overcharges based on transactions with non-defendants).
197. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 582-87
(3d Cir. 1979).
198. Id. at 584. The Third Circuit held:
[Tihe rationale underlying Illinois Brick-that it would be almost im-
possible, and at the very least unwieldy, to attempt to trace the incidence
of the anti-competitive effect of defendants' conduct-bears even greater
truth in the context of a purchaser from a competitor of the defendants.
Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/1
1983] ILLINOIS BRICK
the non-conspiring seller "could not" or "would not" have raised its
prices.' Initially, such a determination would involve the court in com-
plex analysis of price/output decisions, even more complicated than
those envisioned by the Illinois Brick decision.' Indeed, the very same
problems involved in determining the price/output decisions of the
non-conspiring middleman in the pass on situation would be present
where the seller is not part of the conspiracy." 2
2. Multiple Liability
Permitting plaintiffs to recover overcharges from defendants
based on purchases from non-conspirators could subject defendants
to massive liability, far in excess of the illicit gains attained by
price-fixing."3 Surely one of the primary goals of antitrust law is to
force price fixers to disgorge ill-gotten gains; 4 but under the umbrella
200. If the conspirator raised its price by $X and a direct purchaser from the
conspirator raised its price by $X, there is arguably a causal nexus between the price
increases by the conspirator and by its direct purchaser. However, where the non-
defendant sellers' costs are not raised by conspiring competitors' price increment, the
impact of price-fixing can be determined only by examining complex market forces.
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 211, 220 (N.D. I1. 1980).
201. The court in Folding Carton vividly illustrated the difficulties which would
be encountered in analyzing and evaluating such proof:
The affidavit of the plaintiffs' expert illustrates how complicated their
proof would be. His conclusion that the prices plaintiffs paid were affected
by the defendants' conspiracy was reached after an examination of the
difference between the percentages of the independent (presumably the
non-defendants) and integrated (presumably the defendants) companies'
costs and net profits as a percent of sales. Eleven separate costs were
studied. The proof includes speculation about why cost to sales percents
were different in two categories; the expert's opinion was that the de-
fendants hid the effect of the conspiracy by an accounting transfer
mechanism not available to the non-defendants because of the features
of independent as opposed to integrated companies. Charming plaintiffs'
case will be complicated, therefore, by examinations of the differences
between integrated and independent companies involved, and of the myriad
factors which determine costs and prices.
Id. at 220.
202. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580-86
(3d Cir. 1979).
203. Id., at 586. The Third Circuit reasoned:
Allowing recovery for injuries whose casual link to defendants is
tenuous . . . could subject antitrust violators to potentially ruinous
liabilities, well in excess of their illegally earned profits, because under
the theory propounded by [plaintiffs], price-fixers would be held accoun-
table for [illegal] prices that arguably ensued in the entire industry.
Id.
204. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31 (1977); Mid-West Paper
Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580-86 (3d Cir. 1979).
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theory, defendants must do more than surrender the overcharges they
exacted. They must, in effect, make the plaintiffs whole. Essentially
the umbrella theory makes defendants insurers of a "competitive" price
level in the industry. It is patently unfair to hold defendants liable
for overcharges paid to a competitor, particularly where the defen-
dants had no control over the price at which non-conspirators sold
their goods, for in such circumstances, defendants would face poten-
tially ruinous liability, contrary to the stated goals of antitrust law
to maintain a competitive economy." 5
3. Impairment of the Treble Damages Remedy
The Illinois Brick decision concentrated the full treble damages
recovery in the hands of the direct purchasers'" to give them an in-
centive to sue and thereby assure vigorous enforcement of the anti-
trust laws.0 7 Having so designated direct purchasers as the most ef-
fective class of plaintiffs to assume the mantle of private attorneys
general, it would seem counterproductive to permit purchasers from
non-conspirators to look to conspiring defendants for recovery of any
over charges, particularly where the proof of causation would be highly
conjectural and would serve to complicate and prolong trial, thereby
discouraging rather than encouraging active antitrust enforcement."8
Moreover, it would be indeed anomalous to permit purchasers from
non-conspiring competitors of defendants to proceed against the defen-
dants to recover the competitors' profits, even though such purchasers
may not have been harmed at all, but at the same time, to deny in-
205. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31 (1977); Mid-West Paper
Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 586 (3d Cir. 1979). Accord, In
re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 211, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1980), where the
court stated:
Although defendants' price-fixing may have given non-conspiring
sellers an opportunity to raise their prices while remaining relatively com-
petitive, it also gave the non-conspiring sellers an opportunity to com-
pete more effectively with the defendants by setting prices below the
artificial umbrella raised by the defendants. The defendants should not
have to answer in a suit for the actions of the non-defendant sellers in
taking the former anticompetitive opportunity and eschewing the latter
competitive one.
206. This is true except in very rare instances, such as where the indirect purchas-
er bought pursuant to a pre-existing cost-plus contract.
207. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735, 745-46 (1977); Mid-West Paper
Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 585-86 (3d Cir. 1979).
208. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 586
(3d Cir. 1979).
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direct purchasers, who admittedly always absorb at least part of the
illegal overcharge, the right to sue the very same defendants."9
Although several courts1 0 have followed the lead of Mid-West
Paper, the issue of the umbrella theory's viability is by no means
settled. Not suprisingly, the Fifth Circuit in In re Beef Industry An-
titrust Litigation,"' rejected the majority view in Mid-West Paper and,
embracing Judge Higginbotham's dissent, 12 upheld claims based on
the umbrella theory:
It is immaterial whether or not a steer purchased from
plaintiff found its way into the hands of a conspirator
retailer. It is enough if, as alleged, the conspirators' ac-
tivities caused a general depression in wholesale prices and
the intermediary purchasing from a plaintiff based his pric-
ing decision on the depressed wholesale beef price."3
The Fifth Circuit's footnote discussion of the umbrella theory
is woefully lacking in legal analysis and for that reason alone is of
dubious precedential value. Moreover, the court failed to recognize
the fundamental factual differences in Mid-West Paper and Beef In-
dustry. In Mid-West Paper, the question was whether a direct purchas-
er from a non-defendant had standing to pursue claims against the
defendants, while in the Beef Industry case, the question was whether
an indirect seller to a non-defendant had standing to seek redress
from the named defendant. The factual situation in Beef Industry was
thus far more complex than in Mid-West Paper, and thus it would
seem more difficult to sustain the umbrella theory in the Beef Industry
type case. However, the court made no effort to deal with this differ-
ence. Even its reliance on the Mid-West Paper dissent is misplaced.
The thrust of the minority opinion was that where a direct purchaser
was involved, the problems of tracing and multiple liability did not
arise. 1' The same reasoning would not pertain where plaintiff is an
209. Id.
210. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 211, 217-20 (N.D. Ill.
1980); In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 497 F. Supp. 218, 227-28 (C.D.
Cal. 1980).
211. 600 F.2d 1148, 1166, n.24 (5th Cir. 1979).
212. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 595
(3d Cir. 1979).
213. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1166, n.24 (5th Cir.
1979).
214. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 595
et. seq. (3d Cir. 1979) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit did recognize
that if the majority ruling in Mid-West Paper were accepted, then afortiori, the in-
direct sellers' claims based on sales to non-defendants would be barred. Id.
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indirect purchaser. Beef Industry is thus lacking the solid underpinn-
ings of sound legal analysis and compelling logic which characterized
the decision in Mid-West Paper;" '5 the Fifth Circuit seemed more in-
terested in finding a way to keep plaintiffs in court than in methodical-
ly working its way through the issues before it.
The umbrella theory was recently upheld by a district court in
In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litigation."6
Emphasizing the fact that plaintiffs had purchased directly from non-
conspiring sellers, the court found that no tracing problems existed
and that hence permitting plaintiffs to recover for purchasers from
non-conspirators would not create a conceptual strain with the Illinois
Brick holding. 17 The court also ruled that there would be no possibility
of double recovery on the facts presented and that the policies of
Illinois Brick would be furthered by sanctioning the umbrella theory:
Of course, there are certain aspects of Illinois Brick
that parallel this case: because both deal with the question
of standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act, a number of the
policy considerations are necessarily the same. Those
policies-creating a vehicle for recovery to those for whom
it is most appropriate, and providing that the damages
obtained are not unreasonably large-are not violated by
this decision. Rather, they are enhanced and followed."'
The court also made it clear that plaintiffs had the burden of
establishing the causal link between defendants' wrongful acts and
their injury and that the court in granting standing did not lessen
the onus of proving that it was defendants' acts and not other market
forces which created the price structure that prevailed when plain-
tiffs sold their fish.219
In so holding, the court ignored the potential complexities involv-
ed in proving that the price rise by non-conspiring sellers was caused
by the acts of defendants and not other market forces.' It further
overlooked the potential unfairness in forcing defendants to disgorge
claimed overcharges which the defendants had not imposed and from
which they did not derive any benefit. Thus, like the court in Beef
215. In re Bristol Bay, Alaska Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litigation, 530 F. Supp.
36, 38 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
216. Id. at 38-39.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 39.
219. Id. at 37-38, n.3.
220. See supra note 17.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/1
ILLINOIS BRICK
Industry, the court in Bristol Bay engaged in a result-oriented analysis
failing to examine in-depth the policy considerations underlying Il-
linois Brick. Had it done so, an opposite result might well have been
reached.
B. Market Manipulation
A second factual situation which courts have reviewed in light
of Illinois Brick arises where plaintiffs allege that defendants con-
spired to manipulate the market so as to artificially restrict the supply
of a commodity, thereby driving up its price, and claim damages for
overcharges irrespective of whether they can prove that they actual-
ly purchased from the named defendants. The threshold question here
is whether this factual setting is distinguishable from that in which
the umbrella theory, wherein plaintiff seeks recovery from defendant
based on purchases from non-defendants, is at issue. The handful of
lower courts which have faced this issue have not been uniform. The
court in Liang v. Hunt, 1 held on the authority of Mid-West Paper
that such plaintiffs lacked standing unless they could prove actual
purchases from defendants. However, two cases arising in the
Southern District of New York, Strax v. Commodity Exchange Inc. 2
and Pollock v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange,'
have reached opposite results rejecting Liang and distinguishing Mid-
West Paper.
Plaintiffs in Liang brought an action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act and the Commodity Exchange Act 4 alleging that de-
fendants illegally manipulated the soybeans futures market thereby
artificially inflating the price of soybean futures, and claiming damages
even though they had not purchased soybean futures at
supracompetitive levels from defendants.' The court rejected the anti-
trust claim,' finding the case indistinguishable from the Mid-West
Paper holding which denied standing to a plaintiff seeking damages
under an umbrella theory. 7
221. Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
222. 524 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
223. 512 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
224. 7 U.S.C. S 6a(1).
225. Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
226. Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The court also held
that plaintiff had no private right of action under S 4b of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 7 U.S.C. S 6b. That holding has been overruled by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith v. Curran, - U.S, -, - S.Ct. -, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982).
227. 512 F. Supp. at 718-19. As pointed out by the court in Leist v. Simplot,
638 F.2d 283, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1980), futures trading is a "zero-sum" game. One selling
19831
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In Pollock, plaintiffs short-sellers of orange juice futures, alleged
that defendants had manipulated the price of orange juice futures con-
tracts by withholding their respective "long" positions from trading
and effectuated a squeeze which drove such futures contracts to
artificially high levels." s The court rejected the interpretation of Mid-
West Paper put forth in Liang v. Hunt and distinguished market
manipulation from the umbrella pricing situation, noting that de-
fendants' restrictive activity in the orange juice futures market in
Pollock forced prices up throughout that market, whereas the activities
of the defendants in Mid-West Paper had no similar compelling effect
on non-defendant bag sellers."z
Following Pollock, the court in Strax v. Commodity Exchange,
Inc.23 also concluded that Illinois Brick and its progeny did not bar
recovery by plaintiffs who had alleged defendants' conspiratorial
manipulation of the silver market but who had not alleged transact-
ing sales directly with any of the defendants.23" ' The court held that
allegations that "defendants' actions had a 'primary impact' on the
market in which [plaintiff] Strax traded 'as a whole'" were sufficient
to support plaintiff's standing and "proof of the impact of defendants'
alleged action on that market would not require speculation or
attenuated theories of damages" so as to raise the bar of Illinois
Brick.232 The court further noted that were it to adopt defendants'
arguments and deny standing, the result would be to effectively
preclude the application of the antitrust laws to any economic activi-
ty effected through an exchange system, since it is simply impossible
a futures contract is said to be "short;" one buying a futures contract is said to be
"long." One seeking to liquidate his futures position must buy a futures contract if
he is "short" or sell a futures contract if he is "long." Money is made or lost by measur-
ing the price differential between the original transaction and the offsetting trans-
action. Every gain is matched by a corresponding loss. Thus, by withholding the long
positions and hence restricting the supply of contracts, the price of such contracts
would rise.
228. In a market in which supply is restricted, prices move up naturally pur-
suant to basic laws of supply and demand. In a market in which an oligopoly or price
fixing arrangement allows a relatively small seller to raise its price to the level protect-
ed by the price "umbrella," the small seller is not "compelled" to raise his price to
the same extent as a seller in a supply restricted market. Thus, the severe difficulties
attendant with proving damages in an "umbrella" pricing situation, which troubled
the court in Mid-West Paper Products, supra, are not present in the case at bar. Pollock
v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, 512 F. Supp. 711, 719, n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
229. 512 F. Supp. at 719.
230. 524 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
231. Id. at 939.
232. Id.
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to prove that a given purchaser bought from a particular seller in
such a context.233
A more difficult question is whether the results reached in Pollock
and Strax would apply where market manipulation is alleged outside
the context of an exchange market. The Tenth Circuit recently faced
this issue in Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. AMAX, Inc.' Plaintiff, an inter-
national trader in commodities and thus essentially a middleman, alleg-
ed that defendants, potash producers, pursuant to a price-fixing
scheme, had intentionally withheld potash from the market.' Although
plaintiff never actually purchased potash from defendants, it claimed
damages through defendants' concerted refusal to sell potash which
plaintiff could have resold at a profit.23 Relying on Illinois Brick, the
court of appeals held that plaintiff lacked standing, since as a non-
purchaser its claims were inherently speculative and since any treble
damages recovery against defendants would be totally out of line with
the "fruits of the illegality," easily bankrupting the defendants.23 The
court, noting that Illinois Brick would permit a direct purchaser to
recover from a price-fixer for lost sales, suggested that had plaintiff
been able to show a prior course of dealing with the defendants, its
claims may not have been inherently speculative and hence the Illinois
Brick rationale limiting standing would not pertain.3 8
233. Id. at 940.
234. 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. den., __ U.S. __, 5 CCH Trade Cases
60,021 (March 8, 1982).
235. Id. at 865.
236. Id. at 867.
237. Id. at 868.
238. Precisely such a situation was presented In re Uranium Antitrust Litiga-
tion, MDL 342. Plaintiff Westinghouse Electric Corporation was, inter alia, a middleman
in the purchase and sale uranium and brought a treble damages action against nearly
every major uranium producer in the world, alleging coordinated price-fixing and refusal
to deal schemes designed to drive Westinghouse from the field. Westinghouse alleged
that defendants, aware of Westinghouse's contractual commitments to sell uranium
at specified prices to utilities, either refused to sell uranium to Westinghouse or offer-
ed to sell only at conspiratorially set prices so exorbitant that Westinghouse would
be soon bankrupted if it agreed to pay them. Moreover, when defendants did sell
uranium, they imposed resale restrictions designed to prevent such uranium from fall-
ing into Westinghouse's hands indirectly. Thus, Westinghouse alleged that defendants
had specifically targeted its uranium business for extinction.
Defendants moved to dismiss Westinghouse's price-fixing claims on the grounds
that under Illinois Brick and Mid-West Paper, one had to be a purchaser to recover
damages for price-fixing and as a non-purchaser, Westinghouse lacked standing to pro-
secute such claims. Defendants' arguments were somewhat disingenious, since their
conspiratorial activities were designed to, and did in fact, make it impossible for
Westinghouse to become a purchaser of uranium. Illinois Brick, of course, had no "pur-
chaser" requirement. Indeed, in the parent case-Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
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C. The Application of Illinois Brick to Suits
by Competitors in Parallel Chains of Distribution
As previously discussed, Illinois Brick involved a single chain
of distribution with an overcharge passed down the distribution line
to the ultimate purchaser."9 Thus, where plaintiff is a competitor of
defendants and alleges predatory conduct targeted at its business
operations, an issue quite distinct from that of an overcharged purchas-
er in a single chain of distribution arises. In Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,"40 plaintiff Zenith alleged that defen-
dants conspired to fix prices of consumer electronic products sold in
America at prices below prevailing levels as part of a scheme to
monopolize the consumer electronic products field in the United
States.' Zenith in that case did not seek overcharges, but rather lost
profits.242 Hence, the rule of Illinois Brick barring proof of passed on
overcharges is inapposite.243
Nevertheless, Judge Becker in a carefully crafted and tightly
reasoned opinion, found that the rationale of Illinois Brick was still
pertinent to the court's standing inquiry and that the ". . . applicabili-
ty of the Illinois Brick rule to fact patterns which diverge from the
model of a single distribution chain should be determined by assess-
ing, in each factual situation, the weight of the policies articulated
by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick and by the Third Circuit in
Mid-West."2"' Thus, the same analytical framework applicable to the
"umbrella" cases is applicable where, as in Zenith, the gravamen of
the competitive injury is broader than mere overcharges in a single
distribution chain.
2 45
Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)-the plaintiff was not a purchaser but the Supreme
Court upheld its right to damages. Even if Mid-West Paper were read as requiring
direct purchases from a defendant, the decision makes clear that the Court was address-
ing only non-predatory situations. This was a clear-cut case of predation.
The Court denied defendants' motion in an unpublished decision without an opinion
and unfortunately left significant questions regarding the reach of Illino is Brick unresolv-
ed. The various cases that comprised In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation have been
settled.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
240. 494 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
241. Id. at 1247-48.
242. Id. at 1254.
243. Id. at 1255.
244. Id. at 1253. Those factors, as noted supra, are: (1) complex problems created
by tracing; (2) impairment of the treble damage remedy; and (3) multiple liability and
inconsistent verdicts. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
245. See, Dart Drug Corp, v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (D.
Md. 1979) (Illinois Brick does not bar a claim under . 2 of the Sherman Act grounded
on predatory acts by competitors.).
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This is not to say that every plaintiff claiming to be a competitor
of the defendant has ipso facto established standing to proceed. In-
deed, courts have traditionally denied standing where the link between
defendant's alleged anti-competitive conduct and plaintiff's injury are
so attenuated as to force the court to engage in speculation or adopt
complex assumptions, which would threaten the treble damages
remedy."'
A leading case in which standing was denied on these very
grounds is Reading Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp."7 In a
claim which the court characterized as "bizarre," plaintiff, a
manufacturer of copper tubing, alleged that competitors conspired to
keep plaintiff's costs of acquiring scrap copper artificially high.248 There
were three pricing systems for copper: (1) the price quoted by de-
fendants for domestically refined copper; (2) the price quoted on the
London Metals Exchange [LMEJ; and (3) the price quoted in the cop-
per scrap market, wherein plaintiff purchased its copper. 9 Plaintiff
alleged that defendants by keeping prices artificially low in the
domestic and LME markets which, through a complex rationing system
which allocated low price copper among customers who demand more
copper at such prices than defendants would supply, caused the price
of scrap copper to be artificially inflated.2" Relying on Illinois Brick,
the court held plaintiff had no standing, observing that it would have
to engage in hopeless speculation regarding the impact of the alleged
conspiracy in the market for refined copper on the price of scrap
copper.15' Each case must be reviewed on its own facts in light of
246. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, par. 335 et. seq. (1978).
247. 631 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
248. Id. at 11.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 12.
251. The Court reasoned:
Reading's theory of antitrust injury depends upon a complicated series
of market interactions between the two sources of copper: the refined
copper market in which defendants acted and the copper scrap market
in which Reading allegedly sustained injuries. To establish a causal chain,
the actions of innumerable individual decision-makers must be
reconstructed, including the decisions to purchase additional quantities
of copper by fabricators who bought copper from the defendants; the im-
pact of those purchasing decisions of the speculators in the LME market;
the pricing decisions of copper end-product users, as affected by the LME
price, who sold their consumed copper goods for scrap to scrap dealers;
and finally the pricing decision of the independent scrap dealers who
determined the scrap market price that Reading faced.
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d
707 (1977), the Supreme Court held that no antitrust action could be
19831
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the Illinois Brick holding which articulates the caution to be employed
in assessing claims of parties removed from the claimed anticompeti-
tive acts.2
VI. REFLECTIONS ON POST-Illinois Brick CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
The Illinois Brick holding barring indirect purchasers from pros-
ecuting treble damages actions was clear and unambiguous; the con-
fusion which has developed in. subsequent passing on cases has arisen
from the tendencies of the lower courts to "indulge the proffered
fantasy"' of the remote plaintiff rather than to apply the Illinois Brick
ruling in full measure. The Fifth Circuit's functional equivalent stan-
dard is the primary source of present confusion in the progeny of
Illinois Brick. However, the very thorough and well reasoned opinion
of Judge Higginbotham in the Beef Industry case on remand hopeful-
ly signals the death-knell of the functional equivalent rule. As that
opinion correctly points out, pricing which is "formulaic and
mechanical" derived through "non-judgmental mathematical calcula-
tion" - sine qua non of functional equivalence - is non-existent in the
real world except where transactions are governed by a pre-existing,
fixed-quantity, cost-plus contract.2 The pricing practices sanctioned
by the Fifth Circuit as functional equivalents of cost-plus contracts
turned out to be nothing more than "cost-based rules of thumbs" re-
jected by Illinois Brick.5 To the extent that other courts follow the
brought for higher prices paid by an indirect purchaser, who stood at
the end of a vertical distribution line, extending from the sale of the raw
material, where the alleged conspiratorial conduct occurred, to its use
in a finished product, which the plaintiff purchased as the ultimate con-
sumer, three levels down the distribution chain. The list of speculative
economic behavorial assumptions about the marketplace that the Court
found sufficiently remote to invalidate that chain, id. at 741-42, 97 S.Ct.
at 2072, pales in comparison to those necessary to support Reading's claim.
Indeed, to find antitrust damages in this case would engage the court
in hopeless speculation concerning the relative effect of an alleged con-
spiracy in the market for refined copper on the price of copper scrap,
where countless other market variables could have intervened to affect
those pricing decisions. The court's task of tracing would be difficult, if
not impossible, raising in aggravated from the problem that Illinois Brick
was intended to avoid.
631 F.2d at 13-14.
252. Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombadier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
253. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1982-2 CCH Trade Cases 64,815
(N.D. Tex. 1982).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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lead of the district court decision in Beef Industry and refuse to be
seduced by the functional equivalent arguments, the post-Illinois Brick
uncertainty regarding the status of indirect purchaser-plaintiffs will
disappear.
Thus, the courts have demonstrated the capacity to deal with
the enormous procedural and practical problems engendered by the
complex issues which are inherent in major antitrust damage litiga-
tion. In particular, the courts have proved able to fashion rules to
avoid unduly harsh results were Illinois Brick to be given an in-
discriminately broad sweep."' Accordingly, there is no need for the
legislature to intrude into the passing on area. The courts are closer
to major antitrust litigation than the legislature and have not only
a greater appreciation of the practical problems spawned by big cases
but also a better handle on how to eliminate them.
CONCLUSION
While the majority of courts have given the Illinois Brick de-
cision the narrow interpretation which the Supreme Court intended,
a few courts have attempted "to set sail on a sea of doubt"2"7 by
creating new exceptions to the general rule or by so straining the
recognized exceptions to the rule, that the holding is rendered mean-
ingless. A primary virtue of the Illinois Brick holding is to bring some
semblance of certainty and predictability -two features which are
hardly hallmarks in complex antitrust matters-into treble damages
litigation. Courts which have chosen to undercut Illinois Brick by
result-oriented decisions which create new exceptions or expand
without authorization existing exceptions are thus undermining the
treble damages remedy and the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
256. E.g., In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978).
257. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified and affd., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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